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Abstract
Strong relationships and networks prevail in the venture capital (VC) industry and are crucial to the
success of VC firms and their start-up companies. There are at least two kinds of networks among venture
capitalists, the social networks built and nurtured through syndication partnerships among firms and the
educational networks shared by managers of these firms. Such relationships also have an impact on VC
firms’ decisions to syndicate in their future investments, as well as the success of those investments. Co-
investment networks are established and developed during the extensive process of syndication among VC
firms. Educational connections among the managers of venture capital firms are different in the sense
that educational networks are often established long before co-investment networks. This dynamic process
provides an appropriate setting for the analysis of the social ties that facilitate syndication in the venture
capital industry.
The first part of this dissertation will examine how the maintenance of social ties formed during past
partnerships affect venture capital firms’ investment strategy, while previous studies emphasize the benefits
of social networks developed during syndication partnerships. I investigate how indirect ties between two
venture capital firms, as measured by common connections, affect the firm’s future investment decisions and
how they impact the exit strategies of start-up companies. Instrumental variables are employed to mitigate
the problem of endogeneity. The number of common connections that two firms share depends on the prior
decisions of intermediate firms to syndicate with both firms of interest. Thus, we are primarily interested
in the instrumental variables that characterize the common decision among some venture capital firms to
form links with the two firms of interest, and are unrelated with the pair’s investment strategies. Empirical
results suggest that a pair of venture capital firms are more likely to syndicate if they share and share more
common connections. Furthermore, investments venture-backed by VC firms who share and share more
common connections are more likely to receive follow-on funding and to achieve successful exits. Moreover,
there is a tendency for a VC firm to lose multiple connections after it fails an entrepreneurial venture as the
lead syndicate member among firms sharing numerous connections.
The second part of this dissertation attempts to evaluate the benefits of educational networks in the
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venture capital industry. Educational connections are often developed years prior to venture capital firms’
decisions to form syndication partnerships; this reduces endogeneity confounds and allows more focused
analysis of the effect of social ties on investment strategies. Educational networks in the industry also pro-
vide fertile ground on which to examine the financial returns of higher education, including the decision to
pursue a master’s degree in business administration, for example. I employ propensity scores and smooth
coefficient models to estimate the treatment effect of educational networks of different degrees. This study
contributes to the economic literature by attempting to distinguish knowledge, skills and educational con-
nections established in educational institutions. I will also investigate whether degrees from more prestigious
universities are associated with higher probability of a successful exit for a start-up company. Empirical
evidence demonstrates that the proportion of bachelor degree connections among venture capital firms in-
creases the probability of an IPO or sale exit by 4.6% and IPO exit by 3.9%. The evidence also suggests that
the value of bachelor’s level commonality is greater than that of a master’s degree or MBA in this industry.
However, educational connections among venture capital firms from more prestigious universities are not
associated with a higher probability of success for start-up companies.
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Chapter 1
Venture Capital and Common
Connections
1.1 Introduction
Venture Capital is associated with innovation and economic growth, which are crucial elements for job
creation, wealth and social welfare. Venture capital funds identify and provide capital to promising seed,
early-stage, and emerging growth companies. After screening startup companies with promising prospects,
venture capitalists employ their expertise in monitoring and consulting portfolio companies with the end goal
of improving their exit strategy. Social ties play an important role at each level of company development,
and relationships among venture capital firms are often developed and reinforced during the process of
syndication.
The first part of the dissertation will investigate how connections formed through previous syndication
affect future partnerships. Connections developed through the process of prior syndication influence fu-
ture decision making in that network. The purpose of this research is to investigate how the incentive of
maintaining social relationships affects future professional partnerships in the venture capital (VC) industry.
The empirical results are consistent with the hypothesis that indirect ties act as social collateral between
syndicate members and motivate VC firms to offer more promising investments to each other and to add
value to their portfolio companies.
Syndication in the venture capital industry is the cooperation among financial institutions (the VC
firms) during the equity issuance process. The extensive partnership of VC investments in privately held
firms builds the social networks in the VC community. This research focuses on the role of indirect inter-
firm ties as social collateral, which are developed during the process of syndication. Relationships play an
important role in the venture capital industry. The social networks disperse information across geographical
and industrial boundaries and therefore help to expand the spatial radius of exchange (Sorenson and Stuart,
2001). The firms with more influential network positions enjoy better investment opportunities as well as
access to information, and thus better-networked experience significantly better fund performance (Hochberg
et al., 2007).
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While the importance of social networks in the venture capital industry has been documented, it has
remained unclear how the maintenance of quality relationships impacts a firm’s decision to syndicate with
another firm. Also relatively unexplored is the subsequent performance of a start-up company venture-
backed by multiple venture capital members. This study will examine both of these processes. Indirect
inter-firm ties are measured as the number of common connections between two VC firms. Two VC firms
are defined as sharing a common connection if they have both syndicated with the same VC firm in the past
n years.
There are at least three primary reasons that VC firms have an interest in cooperative relationships.
First, a better networked VC firm has the ability to source and attract high quality deal flow (Hsu, 2004).
Second, it is easier for a better networked firm to secure a syndication partner with higher ability, thereby
adding value to its entrepreneurial company. Third, VC firms expect to reciprocate with other VC firms with
whom they share a relationship (Lerner, 1994a,b). Since connections are valuable in the industry, indirect
ties between two firms serve as social collateral when the firms decide to syndicate and allocate effort to fund
a start-up company. Common connections as social collateral also lend value-adding services by motivating
the pair to better monitor and consult the startup company.
The theoretical foundation of this study is based on the paper by Karlan et al. (2009). They defined the
network based trust as the largest amount that one agent can borrow from another. Their model suggests
that connections between individuals can be used as “social collateral,” which can alleviate information
asymmetry problems and secure “informal borrowing.” The VC industry provides a fertile testing ground
to assess the role of network connections as “social collateral” in situations that involve informal borrowing
(Lerner, 1994a,b), asymmetric information and moral hazard.
Information asymmetry, which increases the costs of contracting, is pervasive among venture capital funds
and entrepreneurial companies. Thus, it is crucial to understand the methods by which a VC firm alleviates
such friction while participating in economic transactions with other VC firms. Common connections between
VC firms provide a mechanism by which VCs can alleviate information asymmetry regarding the quality of
investments between existing and new VC firm investors in the same entrepreneurial company. According
to Karlan et al. (2009), strong ties between existing VC firms (or trusted recommenders) and new VC
firm investors reduce asymmetric information about the quality of entrepreneurial companies. With more
common connections at stake, firms can introduce one another to more promising investment opportunities.
Furthermore, the fear of losing multiple relationships motivates firms to provide better service while nurturing
start-up companies. VC firm investors typically endeavor to add value to the entrepreneurial company that
they support when firms share common connections, otherwise rumor of being an incompetent VC investor
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to add value to the entrepreneurial company might spread among their “common friends”. In this scenario,
information spreads through the links of a network (Jackson et al., 2012). Empirical results suggest that VC
firm investors tend to lose their connections as a result of failed investments. Therefore, common connections
should be related both to the tendency to cooperate and to the success of the start-up company.
In the first part of the dissertation, I analyze network relationships in the VC industry in order to study
the role of indirect ties in the decision making process and the syndication process itself. First, I investigate
how common connections formed during past partnerships affect investment decisions in the future. Second,
I study how common connections are related to the performance of start-up companies that are venture-
backed by multiple syndicate members. Third, I examine the possible loss of connections in the future when
VC firms fail in group ventures where syndicate members share common connections.
The indirect ties observed among VC firms may not be exogenous; rather, there may be omitted vari-
ables, such as observable characteristics and abilities, that affect networking, syndication decisions and the
performance of start-up companies. For instance, two VC firms might have complementary skill sets and co-
ordinate frequently and thus share more common connections. To correct for potential endogeneity problems,
I use instrumental variables (IV) motivated by Sørensen (2007). I identify VC firms whose characteristics are
related to the investment decisions among the common connections (or intermediate firms) of a pair of VC
firms, but do not make an impact on the pair’s future syndication decisions. These characteristics of “other”
VC firms are sources of exogenous variation. I also control for VC firm size and cumulative experience in
order to control for selection bias, since more experienced VC firms tend to have common connections with
other more experienced VC firms.
Empirical results suggest that both sharing indirect ties and the strength of indirect ties are positively
associated with the likelihood of syndication between any two VC firms. In addition, the entrepreneurial
ventures backed by VC firms that share more common connections are more likely to survive for another
round of successful financing and exiting. The evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that sharing
common connections facilitates syndication and improve the performance of portfolio companies, as the
possibility of losing multiple relationships motivates VC firms to offer better deals to their peers and to
provide valuable service to the start-up companies.
The first part of this dissertation contributes to the existing literature in three ways. First, it is first
to empirically study how indirect ties (common connections) operate as social collateral and mitigate in-
formation asymmetry when securing promising entrepreneurial ventures and motivate VC firms to provide
value-added services to a start-up company, whereas previous studies focused on direct ties. This dissertation
also expands on the literature by investigating how the incentive to maintain economic ties affects investment
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strategy. The present findings shed light on the industrial organization of the VC industry. Indirect ties
may be an important arena for network evolution in the VC industry. Therefore, it is crucial to understand
how the heterogeneity of indirect ties impacts the formation of future economic ties.
1.2 Literature Review
The first part of this dissertation is motivated by the work of Karlan et al. (2009)and Jackson et al. (2012).
Karlan et al. (2009)build a theoretical model of trust based on informal contract enforcement in the context of
social networks, where individuals use network connections as social collateral to secure informal borrowing.
Their theory predicts that social capital is created in dense networks that allow transacting valuable assets,
whereas bridging social capital is generated in loose networks that increase access to cheap favors such as
information. They argue that strong relationships between employers and trusted recommenders alleviate
information asymmetry regarding the quality of job candidates in recommendation networks; they also find
empirical evidence that network-based trust predicts informal borrowing. They achieve this using data from
Peru. Jackson et al. (2012)in which the authors develop a model providing the foundation for studying how
social structure relates to favor exchange and cooperative behavior. They investigate the informal exchange
of favors sustained by the pressure of the possible loss of multiple social ties in societies where any two
individuals interact too infrequently to support such favor exchange. They find evidence that “any two
individuals exchanging favors have a common friend” using the data of networks in 75 villages in rural India.
This dissertation adds to the literature examining these theories by being the first to use data from the VC
industry, where information asymmetry, cooperative behavior and social ties prevail.
The literature has documented the importance of networks to the venture capital industry. Syndica-
tion networks improve the quality of deal flow for VC firms (Wilson, 1968; Sah and Stiglitz, 1986), by
checking each other’s willingness to invest in potentially promising investments. The pooling of correlated
signals substantially reduces uncertainty about the viability and return potential of investment proposals
from entrepreneurs, and thus help VC firms to select better deals. Sorenson and Stuart (2001) find that
networks among VCs help diffuse information beyond geographical and industry barriers; as a result, the
spatial radius of exchange is expanded, which allows VCs to diversify their portfolios. Inderst and Müller
(2004) suggest that syndication networks may benefit portfolio companies by reducing search time while
entrepreneurs seek financing. Bygrave (1988) argues that syndication networks may also help VC firms to
provide valuable services to their portfolio companies. He suggests that syndication networks facilitate the
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sharing of information, contacts, and resources among VC firms, such as expanding the range of launch
customers or strategic alliance partners for their portfolio companies. Hochberg et al. (2007) find evidence
that networks are an important determinant of VC firm performance and better-networked VC firms enjoy
substantially better fund performance. Previous literature focuses on the importance of social networks in
the venture capital industry, however, it does not fully capture the incentives to maintain social networks and
how they impact venture capital firms’ syndication decisions and the performance of the start-up companies
they support. The first part of this dissertation contributes to the literature by attempting to fill the gap.
This research also differs from previous literature by examining the role of indirect ties as social collateral
in the VC industry instead of direct connections formed during the process of syndication.
Lerner (1994a) provides evidence of “informal borrowing” in which venture capitalists are inclined to
syndicate with venture capitalists with different experience and invite others to co-invest in promising deals
with the expectation of future reciprocity. Hochberg et al. (2010) suggest that VC firms reciprocate by
offering each other investment opportunities. They argue that reciprocity is expected when VCs cooperate
on investments, and each incumbent venture capital firm decides whether to help entrants by weighing the
benefit of reciprocity with an entrant and the cost of helping an entrant; that is, the informal sanctions
imposed by existing incumbents when the VC firm refuses to cooperate with those existing incumbents.
Hochberg et al. (2010) also suggest that networking can affect entry into the VC industry; that is, densely
networked markets restrict entry because of strong networks among incumbent venture capitalists in local
markets. In addition, Hochberg et al. (2015) examine the relationship between network structure and market
competition. They suggest that the presence of strong co-investment networks may mitigate competition
and support cooperative relationships. Hochberg et al. (2011) examine how venture capitalists choose their
syndication partners under certain assumption and find that VCs incline to form syndication partnership
with the ones with different experience.
This dissertation is also closely related to the literature on how relationships and associations among
venture capital firms are related to the quality and performance of an entrepreneurial company. Sørensen
(2007) estimates a structural model based on a two-sided matching model in order to help explain the IPO
rate of VC firms and finds both influence and sorting effects are significant. Nahata (2008) shows that
companies backed by more reputable venture capitalists are more likely to exit successfully, more quickly
access the public market, and have higher asset productivity at IPOs. Hsu (2004) empirically evaluates the
certification and value-added roles of reputable VC firms using a novel sample of entrepreneurial start-ups
with multiple financing offers. He finds that entrepreneurs tend to affiliate with more reputable VC firms
even at the cost of forgoing offers with higher valuations. Megginson and Weiss (1991); Biglaiser (1993);
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Stuart et al. (1999) suggest that it is valuable for entrepreneurs to affiliate with reputable VC firms when
there is information asymmetry about the quality of a start-up company. In this situation, external actors
value the start-up’s quality based on the quality of the start-up’s affiliates. In addition, researchers have
also studied pre-existing networks among venture capital mangers. Bhagwat (2011) finds that educational
connections among managers of different firms can help alleviate search and coordination costs when VC
firms are seeking to form economic ties with other organizations. These papers treat network as given.
1.3 Venture Capital Structure and Data
A venture capital fund is a pooled investment vehicle that primarily provides financing to seed, early-
stage, emerging growth companies that are exposed to high risk. Venture capital funds are typically managed
by a venture capital firm, which often employs individuals with technology backgrounds (scientists, re-
searchers), business training and industry experience. Most VC funds are usually structured as non-traded
closed-end limited partnerships with a lifespan of about 10 years, and they are not obligated to disclose
fund valuations. A typical fund spends its first three or so years screening promising companies in which to
invest, and then nurtures the companies over the next few years by monitoring, consulting and adding value
to them (Ljungqvist et al., 2005). In the second half of the fund’s life, a venture capital fund exhausts its
resources to aid successful portfolio companies to exit via an IPO or to consider sale to a strategic buyer,
an LBO-backed company, another private equity fund, or to management, in addition to recapitalization.
In addition to these exit strategies, an eventual disposition of the company may be a bankruptcy or other
unanticipated outcome (e.g. unidentified foreclosure). The capital inflows generated from successful exit
strategies are then distributed to the fund’s investors. At the very end of a VC fund’s life, investors expect
to receive the proceeds from liquidation or sale of any remaining portfolio holdings.
While VC funds have a limited lifespan, the VC firms that manage the VC funds have no predetermined
end date. Venture capital firms are also structured as partnerships. The general partners serve as the
managers of the firm and as investment advisers to the venture capital funds raised; limited partners are
the investors in venture capital funds, which are high net worth individuals or institutions with significant
available capital, such as university financial endowments, state and private pension funds, foundations,
pooled investment vehicles and insurance companies (Stowell, 2012). Partnership agreements between general
and limited partners are signed at the inception of each fund, and these agreements define the expected
payments to general partners over time (Stowell, 2012). Each VC fund is expected to be fully invested within
five years by screening promising deals and to realize an exit within 3 to 7 years of the original investment
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by consulting, monitoring and providing value-added service to selected startup companies. Success in a
first-time fund often enables VC firms to raise a follow-on fund (Kaplan and Schoar, 2005). Successful private
equity firms are able to stay in business and raise a sequence of funds a few years apart (e.g., 3 to 5 years).
In the present study, I adopt the assumption that the firm’s subsequent fund can also enjoy the experience
and contacts acquired during the tenure of the previous VC fund, therefore fund experience and syndication
networks are measured at the parent firm level rather than the fund level following Hochberg et al. (2007).
Syndicates are defined as the collection of VC firms that support a given portfolio company in the same
investment round. We assume venture capital relationships are developed while venture capitalists gather
information about the quality of the startup company, negotiate to join the venture, and interact with one
another in board meetings and involve themselves in activities that help the portfolio company to succeed.
Thus, connectedness is defined based on whether the co-investment occurred in the same financing round or in
different rounds. Two VC firms are considered connected if they both invested in the same entrepreneurial
company in the same round. There is one common connection between two VC firms if one VC firm is
connected with both of the two VC firms in the past n years. Since a lead syndicate member plays a more
important role in screening the quality of the start-up company, providing their managerial expertise and
monitoring the entrepreneurial company in any syndication round (Hochberg et al., 2007), I also identify
the syndicate member making the largest amount of investment in an investment round as the lead investor
in that round.
The data employed in the analysis is retrieved from Thomson Financial’s Venture Economics/VentureXpert
database. The VentureXpert data are considered the most comprehensive as it only excludes investments
that are less significant (Gompers and Lerner, 1999) and records most venture investments since the early
1960s. Following the literature (Kaplan and Schoar, 2005) and Jones and Rhodes-Kropf (2003), the current
study focuses on investments in US companies made by US based VC funds and firms from 1980 to 2006,
excluding those ventures backed by angels and buyout funds. Only investments made after 1980 are included
because this asset class did not draw significant attention from institutional investors until 1980. To prevent
the most recent startup companies from confounding the analysis, investments made after 2006 are also
excluded to accommodate the fact that those investments are not mature enough to have reached the exit
initiation stage.
1.4 Social Collateral and Networking in VC Industry
Karlan et al. (2009) describe a theory of trust created by networks that suggests that connections can
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be used as social collateral to facilitate informal borrowing. The venture capital industry is involved with
information asymmetry and moral hazard and, as such, it provides an apt arena to test the theory that
the potential for loss of valuable economic ties functions to secure “informal transactions.” To illustrate
the basic logic of this theory, we consider the example of venture capital setups with no formal contract
enforcement, where VC firms hope to invite other VC firms to join a given venture capital investment. It
is uncertain whether the start-up company would be successful in the future, however, VC firm S is better
informed about the profitability of the start-up company than VC firm T as firm S is already one venture
investor of the start-up company. Moreover, the profitability of the start-up company’s successful exit also
depends on the efforts of VC firm S and other syndicate members exert while providing value-added service
to the venture-backed company, including that of VC firm T if it decides to join the venture. VC firm S
might offer a promising deal to firm T with the expectation of reciprocity with firm T in the future, however,
there is no contractual enforcement such that firm T is obligated to offer other promising deals. “Trust”
created by syndication networks between VC firm S and T would motivate firm S not to offer firm T a lemon
investment and both firms to work hard to add value to the start-up company. Such “trust” also facilitates
future reciprocity between VC firm S and T.
The first example of trust is presented in Figure 1.1. A, which is a minor variation on Figure I in Karlan
et al. (2009).1, the network consists of VC firms S and T. The value of their relationship is 2 units, which
represents either the social benefits of friendship, e.g., the value of gaining access to deal information, etc,
and the present value of future transactions, e.g., future income from reciprocation. As in standard models
of informal contracting, firm T will only join the venture if the cost minus benefit of investing in this start-up
company does not exceed the relationship value of 2. The cost could consist of the funding provided, the
effort of providing services, and the opportunity cost of forgoing other investment opportunities. VC firm
T stands to benefit if the start-up company exits successfully in the future. A more interesting example is
demonstrated in Figure 1.1.B, where VC firm S and T have a common connection with VC firm U, the value
of the relationship between S and U is 3, and that between U and T is 4. The common connection U increases
the borrowing limit by min[3, 4] = 3 to a total of 5, and the increase is the value of the weakest link on the
path connecting VC firm S and T through firm U. The intermediate agent U “vouches” for firm S, acting as
guarantor of the venture capital project. If firm S is revealed to have invited firm T into a lemon start-up
company or failed to provide valuable services to the start-up company during syndication, firm U would
receive the signal that firm S is not a competent firm; as a result firm S would lose U’s “friendship”. Since
the value of the connection between VC firms S and U is 3, it can be used as collateral for the investment
1In Karlan et al. (2009)
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from firm T to the start-up company for up to the value of 3. In the third example (Figure 1.1 C), VC Firm
S and T are not directly connected and the limit of the net costs of joining a start-up company is the overall
value of the weakest links on the two paths between S and T, which is min[3, 4]+min[2, 1] = 4. According
to Karlan et al. (2009), the level of trust that can be used as social collateral equals “the sum of the weakest
link values over all disjoint paths” connecting two VC firms. In graph theory, this aggregate quantity is
named as the maximum network flow (Cormen et al., 2001).
Figure 1.1: Social Collateral in Simple VC Networks
Firm s Firm t
A. Two VC network
2
Firm s Firm t
Firm u
B. Common Connection
43
2
Firm s Firm t
Firm u
C. No Direct Link
43
Firm v
2 1
1.4.1 Measure of Social Collateral: Direct and Indirect Ties
The value of connections that can be used as social collateral (link capacity) depend on the value of
direct and indirect ties between two VC firms in the venture capital setting. An ideal measure of the value
of a direct ties would be the value of all future reciprocation between the two VC firms and the access to
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deal information, etc, which is impossible to observe. The measurement of direct ties is based on the history
of syndication activity between the two firms. We use the number of syndications between two VC firms
and the success rate in their syndication history as a proxy for the strength of a direct connection, capturing
the intuition that link values depend on investment in joint social activity. The direct tie between any two
VC firms is an important determinant of syndication decisions and their behavior during syndication. A
VC firm would not want to undermine a relationship with strong direct ties, as the loss of that relationship
would result in the loss of a series of reciprocations. In detail, we measure direct ties between two VC
firms using the number of rounds that two VC firms have syndicated together and the number of start-up
companies they both backed that went through successful exits. Two VC firms might share a significant
amount of syndication rounds because they are reciprocating and expect to reciprocate by inviting each
other into investments. Moreover, the more successful the syndication history, the more likely the two firms
would cooperate again in the future.
The second aspect of social collateral is the “indirect flow” (Karlan et al., 2009), which is sum of the
weakest link values over all connected disjoint paths. Preferably, we would evaluate all the weakest link values
for the case in which two VC firms share connections, and then sum these values. Because of the limitations
of the data, we use the number of common connections as a measure of the strength of indirect ties, thus a
measure of “indirect flow,” captures the intuition of social pressure of losing common connections if a VC firm
fails to offer a quality investment opportunity or to provide valuable services during a syndication. Common
connection is defined on the basis of syndication and connection. As noted above, I define connection as
the co-investment between two VC firms in the same investment round for a given company. The number
of common connections between two VC firms is the number of VC firms that are connected with both of
the two VC firms in question in the past. Since relationships may evolve, and entry into and exit from
the network may change each VC’s connection and common connection with another VC firm, I construct
network connectedness over a trailing 5-year and 10-year window following the literature. The VentureXpert
database provides the VC firm names that back an entrepreneurial company in a given round in year t. In
order to determine the connectedness between two VC firms, I use the investment history of each VC firm.
An example of connectedness and common connections is shown in Figure 1. 2.
In Figure 1. 2, VC Firms 1 and 4 share one common connection that is VC firm 3, as well as VC firms
2 and 4. Since all connections and common connections are also a function of network size, which varies
due to entry and exit by VC firms in our data set over time. To ensure comparability over time, common
connections are normalized by dividing the maximum possible common connections in an n-actor network
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Figure 1.2: Connection and Common Connection
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Start‐up Company 1
Syndication 1 Syndication 2
Start‐up Company 2
ownown own own
Invest Invest Invest InvestInvest
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Firm 4
connected connected
connected
connected
Common 
Connection
Common 
Connection
(i.e., n − 2).
To better illustrate the role of common connections, consider there are two VC firms S and T, and a
startup company. VC firm S has invested in a startup company and it has superior information about the
value of the startup. Firm A tries to invite firm T. Firm T has its own perceived value assigned to the
startup; in this case the expected value of the startup based on firm T’s information is negative. B would
not want to join the venture. But if S and T share a lot of common connections that are valuable to both of
them. T knows that firm S would not invite B if it is a lemon project, as firm S is at risk of losing valuable
common connections with firm T. Now Firm B updates its information about the startup company. Firm
T’s perceived value of the startup could be positive now. Firm S also expects T to invite it to a promising
venture in the future and thus to reciprocate. After firm T and S decide to join the venture, they both
expect each other to work hard to add value to the startup company when co-managing it, otherwise the
information about their incompetence may spread among their common connections and they could lose
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multiple valuable relationships. Thus, sharing and sharing more (common) connections would motivate VC
firms to cooperate and to work hard as syndicate members.
1.5 Variables and Identification
1.5.1 VC Firm Characteristics
There are several characteristics of venture capital firms that could contribute to their decision to syn-
dicate and to the performance of the venture-backed start-up company, such as experience, VC firm size,
geographical location, industry expertise and geographical and industry proximity.
VC firms provide financial and managerial expertise by offering advice on strategic and operational issues
(Bygrave and Timmons, 1992). VC managers use their business experience to help entrepreneurs to deal with
daily management and strategic concerns. Venture capitalists also accumulate abundant social capital during
their prior financing activities and business experiences, which the startup companies can access through
venture capitalists (Stuart et al., 1999). Venture capitalists develop relationships with other VC firms,
entrepreneurs and experts in the industry during the course of their investment activities. Such social ties
provide venture capital firms privileged access to information about promising investments. Experienced
venture capitalists tend to involve themselves in secondary levels of deals that have a greater chance of
going public (Lerner, 1994a,b). Since experienced VC firms are more likely to have privileged information,
superior skills in identifying, managing, monitoring, consulting and funding entrepreneurial companies, VC
firms prefer to partner with more experienced firms. It is typically easier for more experienced and successful
firms to raise capital and have more resources to invest in the subsequent fund (Kaplan and Schoar, 2005).
The VC experience is measured by the total dollars invested up to year T since inception of the firm. As
shown in Table 1.1, the average sample firm experience is about $200 million with a standard deviation of
$1057.76 million and a median of $26.6 million. Firm size is an important indicator of professional experience
and reputation. The measure of firm size includes total assets under management by a VC firm in a given
year, calculated as the aggregate of all its active funds’ assets under management, which constrains the
amount of money available for venture capitalists to invest. The average firm size is $349.63 million with
a standard deviation of $1104.89 million and a median of $36.79 million. A firm’s relative performance
compared to its peers is a crucial criterion for limited partners to consider while selecting the VC firm in
which to invest (Lerner (1994)). Thus a tangible measure of success is calculated as the percentage of past
successful investments up to the current year, where successful startup companies exit via an IPO or sale to
another company. The firm level average IPO/SALE ratio is 28.96% with a standard deviation of 31.15%
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Table 1.1: Summary Statistics
Panel A of this table gives summary statistics for the characteristics of VC firms in the sample. The unit of observation is a
firm-year combination. Panel B of this table reports the characteristics of the history between two VC firms in the sample. The
unit of observation is a firm pair-year combination. Panel C of this table shows summary statistics of the measure of successes
of the entrepreneurial companies, where information about the network connectedness within a pair syndicate is calculated for
the each round of an entrepreneurial company. The unit of observation for round-level success is a company-round investment.
And the unit of observation for eventual exit outcomes (IPO or sale) is company, where information about the connections
within a syndicate is calculated for the first round of an entrepreneurial company’s investment.
N Mean Std Median
Panel A: summary statistics of the characteristics of VC firms
Total # of Ties to Other VC Firms (past 5 yrs) 24,299 26.89 43.72 9
Total # of Ties to Other VC Firms scaled (past 5 yrs) 24,299 0.0319 0.0694 0.0092
Total # of Ties to Other VC Firms (past 10 yrs) 24,299 35.40 54.54 12
Total # of Ties to Other VC Firms scaled (past 10 yrs) 24,299 0.0380 0.0717 0.0121
Current Assets Under Management ($M) 24,299 200.81 1057.76 26.6
Total $ Invested ($M) 24,299 349.63 1104.89 36.79
Industry HHI 24,299 0.5649 0.2647 0.5001
State_HHI 24,299 0.5648 0.2955 0.5069
Total # of Syndications (rounds) 24,299 36.08 91.35 6
% IPO or Mergers 24,299 0.2896 0.3115 0.2142
Panel B: summary statistics of the syndication history between two VC firms
# of Common Connections (past 5 yrs) 36,776,751 0.9418 4.5951 0
Norm. # of Common Connections (past 5 yrs) 36,776,751 0.0009 0.0053 0
# of Common Connections (past 10 yrs) 36,776,751 1.5022 6.6607 0
Norm. # of Common Connections (past 10 yrs) 36,776,751 0.0014 0.0072 0
I_Common Connections (past 5 yrs) 36,776,751 0.1622 0.4019 0
I_Common Connections (past 10 yrs) 36,776,751 0.2025 0.4019 0
I_syndicated before 36,776,751 0.0155 0.1236 0
Total # of Rounds Pair Syndicated 36,776,751 0.0441 0.7286 0
Total # of successful syndication; 36,776,751 0.0105 0.1544 0
I(Both Firms Invested in Same Market) 36,776,751 0.2484 0.4321 0
Geographical distance (miles) 21,558,391 2,055.01 1,537.65 1,767.44
Panel C: Summary Statistics for Company Success and Stages
Company-Round Level
I(Connected Syndicate, past 5 yrs) 70,769 0.4059 0.4911 0
I(Connected Syndicate, past 10 yrs) 70,769 0.4095 0.4918 0
Round Success 70,769 0.8281 0.3773 1
Stage_Early/Seed 23,049 36.14%
Stage_Expansion 23,645 37.07%
Stage_Later 17,090 26.79%
Company Level
I(Connected Syndicate, past 5 yrs) 22,735 0.2579 0.4375 0
I(Connected Syndicate, past 10 yrs) 22,735 0.2628 0.4402 0
IPO 22,735 0.1464 0.3535 0
IPO/Sale 22,735 0.4290 0.4949 0
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and a median of 21.42%. These measures of experience capture the firm’s experience, reputation and past
success.
A growing body of literature suggests that social networks are geographically localized when individuals
engage in activities including contracting and economic exchange (Bengtsson and Ravid, 2009). In the VC
industry, geographic proximity should not only facilitate learning about private investment opportunities and
establishing cooperative relationships with local VC firms, but also monitoring and consulting entrepreneurs.
Geographic proximity is constructed according to Bengtsson and Ravid (2009). I first use a zip code database
to look up the longitude and latitude of the main office for any VC firm, and then calculate distance in miles
using the Haversine formula, which takes into account the curvature of the Earth between any two VC firms.
The average distance between any two VC firms in the sample is 2,055 miles with a standard deviation
of 1,538 miles and a median of 1,767 miles. The measure of geographic concentration is calculated as a
Herfindahl measure of a firm’s past investments into the 50 U.S. states following Bhagwat (2011). The
average Herfindahl of states is around 0.56 with a standard deviation of 0.30, suggesting that VC firms are
locally concentrated in the sample.
VC firms take into account the relative investment expertise and industry specific experience of a given
firm while choosing potential syndicate partners. VC firms with special knowledge of a particular industry
will likely be sought after by VC firms that plan to investigate that industry. So, industry concentra-
tion is calculated by using 6 broad industry categories defined by VentreXpert database: Biotechnology,
Communications and Media, Computer Related, Medical/Health/Life Science, Non-High-Technology and
Semiconductors and Other Electronics following Bhagwat (2011). The average Herfindahl index of industry
is 0.56 with a standard deviation of 0.26.
In addition, an indicator variable is constructed to account for business experience and specialty both
in a particular industry and local area, which is assigned a value of 1 if two firms have made investments
in the same market up to year T. Following Bhagwat (2011), a “market” is defined as the combination of
a particular industry out of 6 industries and 50 states. About 25% of all possible pairs of VC firms have
invested in the same market before. A variable indicating the propensity of a VC firm to cooperate with
other firms is also included. In Table 1.1, the average number of total investments in which a firm has
syndicated in the past, in terms of number of rounds is approximately 36. Since a firm’s network position is
a potential determinant of their partnering strategies and the success of the start-up companies they back
(Hochberg et al., 2007), I control for firm network position by calculating the number of VC firms that a
firm has syndicated with (e.g., degrees) in the past 5 and 10 years.
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1.5.2 Company-Level Performance Measures
The data obtained from VentureXpert do not disclose the fraction of equity acquired by VC firms or
the amount of securities they hold, and it misses the amount of capital invested by VC firms on occasion.
To account for this, we employ indirect measures of company-level performance modeled on VC literature.
Staged financing is designed to fund investments in VC industry such that portfolio companies are peri-
odically re-evaluated and only those with promising prospects advance to subsequent funding rounds and
finally exit successfully (Gompers, 1995). Thus, the interim success of a startup company is measured by
an indicator with a value of 1 if it receives follow-on funding, and a 0 otherwise. Without public data to
calculate the capital return of any startup company, this dissertation is modeled on the work of Gompers
and Lerner (2000); Hochberg et al. (2007); Sørensen (2007), in which successful exits are viewed as a final
signal of a startup company’s success. Successful portfolio companies are either taken public or sold to
another company. On average 82.8% of investments receive follow-on funding in the sample, with a standard
deviation of 37.7%; and 42.9% of start-up companies exit succesfully, with the IPO ratio 14.64%.
1.5.3 Investment Opportunities and Public Market Conditions
To control for industry competition, market-level exit conditions and the investment environment, I
include capital inflows into VC industry and industry-level value-weighted book-to-market ratios in the
present analysis. Gompers and Lerner (2000) identify a pattern demonstrating increased costs for VC firms
backing startup companies as capital flows into the VC industry, which suggests that startup company
valuations are driven up as a result of competition for limited investment opportunities among firms. Thus,
capital inflows are an important signal of competition for investment opportunities that could affect the
quality of portfolio companies and the likelihood of achieving successful exits. After Hochberg et al. (2007),
capital inflows are calculated as the aggregate VC fund inflows in the year a sample fund was raised. The
present study also employs a public market pricing multiple (e.g., book to market ratio) as an alternative
measure of investment conditions in the private equity markets as proposed by Gompers and Lerner (2000).
After Hochberg et al. (2007); Gompers et al. (2008); Bhagwat (2011), investment climate is measured using
the value-weighted book-to-market ratio of publicly traded companies for each of the six 2 VentureXpert
industries in year t.
2Industry specialization is calculated on the basis of the broad industry categories as defined by the VentreXpert database:
Biotechnology, Communications and Media, Computing, Medical/Health/Life Science, Non-High-Technology and Semiconduc-
tors and Other Electronics.
15
1.5.4 Instrumental Variable
A first-order concern is that some omitted variables simultaneously may make syndication more advan-
tageous for two VC firms and they share more common connections as a result, which makes networking
endogenous. For instance, a venture capital firm with superior monitoring abilities or with access to better
deals is more likely to be connected with other venture capitalists, and a well-connected firm tends to share
more common connections with other firms. This VC firm’s investment performance may improve as a result
of its monitoring ability or access to optimal deals. Endogeneity can also stem from the skill sets of a pair
VC firms. Two VC firms might have complementary skill sets. As a result, they tend to cooperate and
fund more successful start-up companies. In this case, it is more likely that the two VC firms share common
connections. We would overestimate the effect of indirect ties on syndication decisions and start-up company
performance and underestimate the effect of complementary skill sets.
While it is difficult to address omitted variables in the absence of a natural experiment, I adopt the
instrumental variables approach to alleviate endogeneity confounds within the limitations of the available
data. The instrumental variables are motivated by Sørensen (2007), who argues that other firms’ character-
istics provide a source of exogenous variation as other firms’ characteristics are independent of a given VC
firm’s unobserved heterogeneity. Using the characteristics of other firms as instruments ignores the fact that
the observed network structure is determined in equilibrium.
While it is difficult to address omitted variables in the absence of a natural experiment, I adopt the
instrumental variables approach to alleviate endogeneity confounds within the limitations of the available
data. The instrumental variables are modeled in a way that is motivated by Sørensen (2007), who argues
that other firms’ characteristics provide a source of exogenous variation as other firms’ characteristics are
independent of a given VC firm’s unobserved heterogeneity. Using the characteristics of other firms as
instruments ignores the fact that the observed network structure is determined in equilibrium. The first set
of instrumental variables I propose for to represent indirect ties among a pair of VC firms is the average
number of other VC firms’ common connections and average number of connections, where other VC firms
are connected with a given pair of VC firms’ intermediate firms (common connection), but not directly linked
with either firm of a given pair of interest, as shown in Figure 1. 3. The characteristics of those VC firms
that are connected with intermediate firms but not linked to Firm A and B, affect the intermediate firms
c1,...cn’s investment decisions but do not affect A and B’s decision to cooperate in the future.
The second set of instruments is generated by finding VC firms similar to the pair of VC firms of interest
but which are geographically distant. Not only are the similar VC firms’ characteristics independent of a
given pair of VC firms’ unobserved heterogeneity, but geographical distance mitigates the correlation of the
16
Figure 1.3: Instrumental Variable I
Firm A Firm B
Common 
Connection
VCs connected with C1,…, Cn but not connected with A or B   
IV: avg common connections and degrees of VCs  
connected with C1,…, Cn 
but not connected with A or B 
Firm C1,…,Cn
pair’s decisions to form links. The criteria for a firm to be considered “similar” are as follows. First, similar
VC firms must fall into the same deciles according to the size ranking/experience ranking and the ranking
of social network degrees (the number of VC firms they have formed a link with in the past 5/10 years).
Second, similar VC firms are founded around the same period and within ±5 years of a given VC firm’s
founding date. Moreover, similar firms should have the same industry preference as the commonly connected
VC firms of interest. According to self-reported industry preferences of VC firms in the sample, there are
108 distinct industry preferences, which I use to categorize similar VC firms. To generate exogeneity, similar
VC firms are not located in the same state and have different industry preferences from the pair of VC firms.
After we pool similar VC firms for a given VC firm, for any given pair of VC firms, we only choose those
firms that demonstrate the same industry preferences in their investments as the pair’s common connections.
Then we choose the closest ranked (in terms of size/experience) VC firm that is in the same size/experience
decile as a given VC firm. Two instruments are formed for a given VC firm pair’s common connections by
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taking the average of common connections between two similar VC firms and the degrees of similar VC firms.
As shown in Figure 1. 4, the characteristics of similar VC firms are related with the commonly connected
firms’ decision to co-invest with Firm A and B but not impact the value of future links between A and B.
By using these instruments, we are assuming the value of a link is a function only of the characteristics of
the two firms involved, and a link is formed if the value of the link is greater than 0; a link is formed if
both firms involved in the link prefer forming the link regardless of whether other further individual links
are formed or not (Hochberg et al., 2011).
Figure 1.4: Instrumental Variable II
Firm A Firm B
Common 
Connection
Firm A’
Geographical distant: in another state
Founded within ± 5 years of A
Different industry preference than A
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Same size/experience Decile as A
Same Degree Decile as A
Closest to A in terms of size/experience ranking 
Firm B’
matched
IV: avg common connections/Degrees of VCs A’ and B’
matched
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1.6 Empirical Results
1.6.1 Common Connections and Pair Syndication
This dissertation first analyzes how common connections affect syndication after controlling for other
known factors that affect cooperation. When interpreting the statistics, it is important to keep in mind that
each unit of observation is a unique combination of firm I, firm J and year t combination. Firms only appear
in the data set starting with the year of their initial investment. Given 26 years of data for each firm pair
from 1981 to 2006, there are 7,416,940 observations. For each year in the sample, the unit of observation
is a firm pair. I include relative differences between any pair of active VC firms as control variables in the
analysis, since previous literature suggests that a VC firm tends to co-invest with firms of similar size, and
which share similar experience and past performance (Lerner, 1994a,b).
Having controlled for the investment history, geographical proximity, and relative differences in business
experience and firm characteristics, empirical results shown in Table 1.2 and Table 1.3 confirm that sharing
common connections increases the probability of syndication for any given pair of active VC firms. The
dependent variable of interest in the regression is an indicator denoted by I (Pair Syndication), that takes on
the value 1 if any pair of VC firms I and J syndicate an investment in year t, and 0 otherwise. I estimate these
models separately for the three independent variables of interest: an indicator for the presence of common
connection between the two VC firms in the prior 5 years and the natural log of one plus the number of
common connections between two given firms, as well as the logarithm of 1 plus scaled common connections.
Following Petersen (2009), the standard errors are clustered two-way by each firm separately. In addition,
year controls are included in the ordinary least squares model but not shown. The regression results are
reported in Table 1.2 column 1, and indicate that the predicted probability of syndication is positively
associated with the presence of a common connection at some point in the prior five years. All else being
equal, the presence of a common connection between two VC firms increases their chance of syndication by
0.79%, and is statistically significant at the 0.00001% level. The strength of common connections between
any two active firms is also associated with a significantly higher probability of syndication. Sharing one
more common connection increases the chance of syndication between two firms by 0.48%, which is also
statistically significant. Since the size of a network may evolve over time, the third column controls for
such variation by normalizing the number of common connections by (n-2), which is the largest number
of common connections possible in a network. A one standard deviation (0.0053) increase in the natural
log number of normalized common connections from the mean value results in an increase of 0.93% in
the predicted probability of syndication between the two firms. Comparing to the average probability of
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Table 1.2: OLS of Pair Syndication on Common Connections
This table shows the results of an OLS regression where the dependent variable is an indicator=1 if a given pair of VC firms
syndicate an investment in year t. The unit of observation is a firm i, firm j and year t combination. In Column 1, the main
independent variable is an indicator =1 if the pair of VC firms share at least one common connection in the last 5 years and
0 otherwise. In Column 2, the independent variable of interest is logarithm of 1 plus the number of common connections
in the last 5 years between the two firms. In Column 3, the independent variable of interest is the logarithm of 1 plus the
normalized number of common connections in the last 5 years between the two firms, where the denominator is the maximum
possible common connections (n-2). A constant term, year indicator variables, is included but not shown in the table. The
OLS regression coefficients are shown in the table and standard errors are heteroskedasticity robust and clustered two-way by
VC firms i and j.
Variables I(Pair Syndication) I(Pair Syndication) I(Pair Syndication)
I(Common Connections) 0.007872***
(0.00037)
ln(1+ # of Common Connections) 0.011649***
(0.00060)
ln(1+ Norm. # of Common Connections) 1.76033***
(0.09175)
ln(1+# of Rounds Pair Syndicated) 0.053594*** 0.045360*** 0.037768***
(0.00359) (0.00359) (0.00386)
ln(1+# of Companies with Successful exit) 0.170249*** 0.164175*** 0.141404***
(0.00745) (0.00730) (0.00598)
I(Both Firms Invested in Same Market) 0.001243*** -0.002583*** 0.000279
(0.00025) (0.00037) (0.00034)
ln(1+Zipcode Distance) -0.001812*** -0.0017589*** -0.001817***
(0.00018) (0.00017) (0.00016)
ln(Abs. Diff in # of Ties to Other VC Firms) 0.001167 *** 0.001193 *** 0.001834***
(Past 5 yrs) (0.00017) (0.00015) (0.00015)
ln(Abs. Diff in # of Syndications) 0.000989*** 0.000489*** 0.000638***
(0.00019) (0.00017) (0.00016)
ln(Abs. Diff in Asset Under Mngmt.) 0.000554*** 0.000133 0.000237**
(0.00012) (0.00011) (0.00011)
ln(Abs. Diff in # Total $ Invested) -0.000129 -0.00060*** -0.000794***
(0.00015) (0.00013) (0.00013)
ln(Abs. Diff in # Industry HHI) -0.005585*** -0.003061*** -0.004406***
(0.00072) (0.00061) (0.00065)
ln(Abs. Diff in # State HHI) -0.008862*** -0.002284*** -0.002397***
(0.00106) (0.00074) (0.00075)
ln(Abs. Diff in # % IPO or Merger) 0.001094*** 0.003072*** 0.002943***
(0.00042) (0.00046) (0.00048)
Observations 7,416,940 7,416,940 7,416,940
Rsquare 11.66% 12.12% 12.76%
Heteroskendasticity robust standard errors, clustered two-way by VC firm i and firm j, in parentheses
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1
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Table 1.3: OLS of Pair Syndication on Common Connections
This table shows the results of an OLS regression where the dependent variable is an indicator=1 if a given pair of VC firms
syndicate an investment in year t. The unit of observation is a firm i, firm j and year t combination. In Column 1, the main
independent variable is an indicator =1 if the pair of VC firms shares at least one common connection in the last 10 years and
0 otherwise. In Column 2, the independent variable of interest is logarithm of 1 plus the number of common connections in the
last 10 years between the two firms. In Column 3, the independent variable of interest is the logarithm of 1 plus the normalized
number of common connections in the last 10 years between the pair of VC firms, where the denominator is the maximum
possible common connections (n-2). A constant term, year indicator variables, is included but not shown in the table. OLS
regression coefficients are shown in the table and standard errors are heteroskedasticity robust and clustered two-way by VC
firms i and j.
Variables I(Pair Syndication) I(Pair Syndication) I(Pair Syndication)
I(Common Connections) 0.004130***
(Past 10 yrs) (0.00030)
ln(1+ # of Common Connections) 0.005400***
(Past 10 yrs) (0.00034)
ln(1+ Norm. # of Common Connections) 0.571776***
(Past 10 yrs) (0.06329)
ln(1+# of Rounds Pair Syndicated) 0.054205*** 0.048977*** 0.044580***
(0.00360) (0.00365) (0.00402)
ln(1+# of Companies with Successful exit) 0.170769*** 0.169597*** 0.162614***
(0.00744) (0.00744) (0.00666 )
I(Both Firms Invested in Same Market) 0.002330*** -0.000038 0.002238***
(0.00025) (0.00029) (0.00037)
ln(1+Zipcode Distance) -0.001802*** -0.001793*** -0.001828***
(0.00018) (0.00018) (0.00018)
ln(Abs. Diff in # of Ties to Other VC Firms) 0.000915*** 0.001188*** 0.001553***
(Past 10 yrs) (0.00019) (0.00018) (0.00018)
ln(Abs. Diff in # of Syndications) 0.000992*** 0.000552*** 0.000719***
(0.00020) (0.00019) (0.00017)
ln(Abs. Diff in Asset Under Mngmt.) 0.000688*** 0.000467*** 0.000564***
(0.00012) (0.00012) (0.00012)
ln(Abs. Diff in # Total $ Invested) 0.000078 -0.000277* -0.000351**
(0.00017) (0.00016) (0.00015)
ln(Abs. Diff in # Industry HHI) -0.006107*** -0.004508*** -0.005542***
(0.00075) (0.00069) (0.00071)
ln(Abs. Diff in # State HHI) -0.010167*** -0.006224*** -0.007236***
(0.00112) (0.00090) (0.00088)
ln(Abs. Diff in # % IPO or Merger) 0.000807* 0.002045*** 0.001693***
(0.00043) (0.00044) (0.00045)
Observations 7,416,940 7,416,940 7,416,940
Rsquare 11.6% 11.71% 11.78%
Heteroskendasticity robust standard errors, clustered two-way by VC firm i and firm j, in parentheses
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1
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syndication 1.34% between any pair of active VC firms, the increases of syndication probability due to the
existence of common connections and the strength of those connections are all economically significant.
Empirical results also confirm that firms that are geographically close are more likely to syndicate. The
probability that two firms co-invest in a startup company drops by 0.46% if they move one standard deviation
(1,538 miles) of distance away, compared to the probability evaluated at the mean distance between two VC
firms. As with geographic proximity, results suggest that investment proximity is an important predictor
of syndication. The coefficients of the absolute difference variables indicate that two firms more likely to
syndicate when they have similar levels of industry and local investment concentrations. Firms tend to
seek out partners that are different in terms of syndication network: co-investment history and amount of
social ties to other firms. This pattern is consistent with a resource sharing motive for cooperation, whereby
firms seek out partners with complementary resources they lack, as suggested by Hochberg et al. (2015).
Moreover, VC firms tend to syndicate with VCs firms that have different levels of past investment success
and assets under management. However, the coefficients of the absolute difference between firm experiences
is negative, as firms tend to syndicate if they have the same level of investment experience. History and
successful cooperation between two VC firms also increases the likelihood of future syndication, suggesting
that direct ties between two firms encourage them to co-invest in the future.
Table 1.3 repeated the same regressions using common connection measures generated by syndication
over the previous 10 years. All the coefficients have the same sign as the results of regression for the common
connections over prior 5 years. The coefficients on the common connections measures are smaller, though
statistically and economically significant. This indicates that the effect of indirect ties from social networks
decay over time. Thus syndication is positively associated with the presence and the number of common
connections between two firms.
To test whether indirect ties facilitate inter-firm economic ties, we should study the impact of common
connections on the number of syndications that any given pair of VC firms enter into in the future. In order
to investigate such a relationship, I employ an ordinary least squares regression in which the dependent
variable is the number of times firm I and firm J co-invest in any investment in year t. An OLS model is
estimated separately for the three independent variables of interest: an indicator for the presence of common
connections between the two firms, the natural log of one plus the number of common connections between
two given firms, and the natural log of one plus the normalized number of common connections between
two given firms. The regression results are reported in Table 1.4 and 1.5. Standard errors are clustered
two-way separately by each firm and all regressions include year controls. As reported in Table 1.4 and
Table 1.5, firms in geographic proximity tend to cooperate more often than those located farther apart.
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Table 1.4: OLS of Number of Pair Syndication on Common Connections
This table shows the results of an OLS regression where the dependent variable is the number of times a given pair of VC firms
syndicate in year t. The unit of observation is a pair of VC firms a firm i, firm j and year t combination. In Column 1, the main
independent variable is an indicator =1 if the pair shares at least one common connection in the last 5 years and 0 otherwise.
In Column 2, the independent variable of interest is logarithm of 1 plus the number of common connections in the last 5 years
between the two firms. In Column 3, the independent variable of interest is the logarithm of 1 plus the normalized number of
common connections in the last 5 years between the two firms. A constant term, year indicator variables, is included but not
shown in the table. OLS regression coefficients are shown in the table and standard errors are heteroskedasticity robust and
clustered two-way by VC firms i and j.
Variables # of Syndication # of Syndication # of Syndication
I(Common Connections) 0.006943***
(0.00058)
ln(1+ # of Common Connections) 0.0126904***
(0.00076)
ln(1+ Norm. # of Common Connections) 3.18925***
(0.34284)
ln(1+# of Rounds Pair Syndicated) 0.075373*** 0.066203*** 0.045804***
(0.00693) (0.00699 ) (0.00849)
ln(1+# of Companies with Successful exit) 0.386715*** 0.380000*** 0.334000***
(0.03381) (0.03378) (0.02644)
I(Both Firms Invested in Same Market) 0.000090 -0.004615*** -0.004070***
(0.00046) (0.00065) (0.00109)
ln(1+Zipcode Distance) -0.002754*** -0.002697*** -0.002765***
(0.00039) (0.00038) (0.00036)
ln(Abs. Diff in # of Ties to Other VC Firms) 0.001256*** 0.001248*** 0.002296***
(Past 5 yrs) (0.00026) (0.00025) (0.00027)
ln(Abs. Diff in # of Syndications) 0.001099*** 0.000525* 0.000336
(0.00028) (0.00028) (0.00029 )
ln(Abs. Diff in Asset Under Mngmt.) 0.000463*** -0.000024 -0.000239
(0.00017) (0.00017) (0.00020)
ln(Abs. Diff in # Total $ Invested) -0.000137 -0.000687*** -0.00151***
(0.00025) (0.00023) (0.00027)
ln(Abs. Diff in # Industry HHI) -0.006143*** -0.00316*** -0.002959***
(0.00104) (0.00098 ) (0.00113)
ln(Abs. Diff in # State HHI) -0.010412*** -0.00263** 0.004051*
(0.00139) (0.00116) (0.00222)
ln(Abs. Diff in # % IPO or Merger) 0.002093*** 0.004371*** 0.005995***
(0.00061 ) (0.00069) (0.00097)
Observations 7,416,940 7,416,940 7,416,940
Rsquare 14.31% 14.51% 15.64%
Heteroskendasticity robust standard errors, clustered two-way by VC firm i and firm j, in parentheses
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1
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Table 1.5: OLS of Number of Pair Syndication on Common Connections
This table shows the results of an OLS regression where the dependent variable is the number of times a given pair of VC firms
syndicate in year t. The unit of observation is a pair of VC firms a firm i, firm j and year t combination. In Column 1, the main
independent variable is an indicator =1 if the pair shares at least one common connection in the last 10 years and 0 otherwise.
In Column 2, the independent variable of interest is logarithm of 1 plus the number of common connections in the last 10 years
between the two firms. In Column 3, the independent variable of interest is the logarithm of 1 plus the normalized number of
common connections in the last 10 years between the two firms. A constant term, year indicator variables, is included but not
shown in the table. OLS regression coefficients are shown in the table and standard errors are heteroskedasticity robust and
clustered two-way by VC firms i and j.
Variables # of Syndication # of Syndication # of Syndication
I(Common Connections) 0.003104***
(Past 10 yrs) (0.000518)
ln(1+ # of Common Connections) 0.003774***
(Past 10 yrs) (0.00047)
ln(1+ Norm. # of Common Connections) 0.997755***
(Past 10 yrs) (0.19296 )
ln(1+# of Rounds Pair Syndicated) 0.075990*** 0.072356*** 0.058814***
(0.00694) (0.00699) (0.00850)
ln(1+# of Companies with Successful exit) 0.387182*** 0.386362*** 0.372948***
(0.03377) (0.03385) (0.03074)
I(Both Firms Invested in Same Market) 0.0012649*** -0.000306 -0.000472
(0.00043) (0.00044) (0.00101)
ln(1+Zipcode Distance) -0.002740*** -0.002738*** -0.002792***
(0.00039) (0.00039) (0.00039)
ln(Abs. Diff in # of Ties to Other VC Firms) 0.001115*** 0.001307*** 0.002188***
(Past 10 yrs) (0.00030) (0.00031) (0.00034)
ln(Abs. Diff in # of Syndications) 0.001074*** 0.0007738** 0.000468
(0.00030) (0.000306 ) (0.00031)
ln(Abs. Diff in Asset Under Mngmt.) 0.000600*** 0.000448** 0.000325
(0.00018) (0.00018) (0.00020)
ln(Abs. Diff in # Total $ Invested) 0.000028 -0.000214 -0.000831***
(0.00026) (0.00026) (0.00028)
ln(Abs. Diff in # Industry HHI) -0.006699*** -0.005616*** -0.005057***
(0.00106) (0.00103) (0.00117)
ln(Abs. Diff in # State HHI) -0.011802*** -0.009129*** -0.005111***
(0.00143) (0.00138) (0.00184)
ln(Abs. Diff in # % IPO or Merger) 0.001788*** 0.002637*** 0.003644***
(0.00062) (0.00063) (0.00082)
Observations 7,416,940 7,416,940 7,416,940
Rsquare 14.30% 14.32% 14.50%
Heteroskendasticity robust standard errors, clustered two-way by VC firm i and firm j, in parentheses
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1
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According to Table 1.4, two VC firms move one standard deviation in distance closer, which increases the
predicted number of syndication between them by about 0.002, which is statistically significant. Relative to
the average number of syndication 0.0184, the increase is economically significant. Echoing the OLS results
in Table 1.2 and 1.3, firms syndicate more often with other similar firms on the dimensions of investment
experience, while syndicating less often with firms of similar network characteristics, firm sizes and historical
IPO percentage. And the coefficients on the relative experience difference are negative. In addition, firms
that have invested in the same VC market tend to syndicate less with each other according to Table 1.4.
Note that the coefficient of the indicator of having invested in the same market is positive and significant in
column 1 of Table 1.5. Such inconsistent results suggest that the indicator of having invested in the same
market could be too coarse a measure of relative investment experience.
The predicted number of syndications per year between two firms increases by 0.69% compared to the
number of syndications without a common connection over past 5 years according to Table 1.4. Such an
increase is relatively large compared to the average number of syndications between any two VC firms
0.0184. This indicates that common connections are associated not only with an increase in the probability
of syndication, but an increase in the frequency of syndication, as well. Column 2 of Table 1.4 illustrates
that the strength of connections increases the number of cooperative ventures. Sharing one more common
connection increases the number of joint ventures between two firms by 0.0053, compared to the predicted
number of ventures evaluated at the mean number of common connections. According to Column 3 of Table
1.4, a one standard deviation (0.0053) increase in the normalized number of common connections increases
the number of syndications between two VC firms by 0.0169. All the coefficients of common connections
are statistically significant. Table 1.5 reports similar results using the common connections between two VC
firms in the past 10 years. All the results are similar but the coefficients of common connection measures
are smaller than those estimated using the past 5 years of social networks.
In order to mitigate the problem of omitted factors and endogeneity, I include VC firm pair dummy vari-
ables (Table 1.6 and Table 1.7) and instruments (Table 1.8) in the analysis. The regression results are nearly
the same as the results in Table 1.4, while the coefficients of the common connections and normalized num-
ber of common connections controlling for firm pair fixed effects are smaller with larger standard deviations
than those in the OLS without firm pair fixed effects. This suggests that we would overestimate the effect
of common connections on pair syndication without controlling for the omitted VC firm pair characteristics.
Table 1.8 presents regression results with the IVs generated using two different methodologies. IV1 is the
average common connections of VC firms that are connected with a VC pair’s common connections but not
connected directly with the particular pair; IV2 is the average common connections of a matched similar VC
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Table 1.6: OLS of Number of Pair Syndication on Common Connections-pair fixed effects
This table shows the results of an OLS regression where the dependent variable is the number of times a given pair of VC firms
syndicate in year t. The unit of observation is a pair of VC firms a firm i, firm j and year t combination. In Column 1, the main
independent variable is an indicator =1 if the pair shares at least one common connection in the last 5 years and 0 otherwise. In
Column 2, the independent variable of interest is the logarithm of 1 plus the number of common connections in the last 5 years
between the two firms. In Column 3, the independent variable of interest is the logarithm of 1 plus the normalized number of
common connections in the last 5 years between the two firms. Two constant term, year indicator variables and the VC firms
pair dummies, are included but not shown in the table. OLS regression coefficients are shown in the table and standard errors
are heteroskedasticity robust and clustered by the pair of VC firms.
Variables # of Syndication # of Syndication # of Syndication
I(Common Connections) 0.0067***
(Last 5 Years) (0.0002) 0.0169***
ln(1+ # of Common Connections) (0.0003)
(Last 5 Years)
ln(1+ Norm. # of Common Connections) 3.1092***
(Last 5 Years) (0.1077 )
ln(1+# of Rounds Pair Syndicated ) -0.3718 *** -0.3799*** -0.3745***
(0.0057) (0.0057) (0.0056)
ln(1+# of Companies with Successful exit) 0.3815*** 0.3687*** 0.3219***
(the Pair syndicated) (0.0101) (0.0101) (0.0090)
I(Both Firms Invested in Same Market) 0.0047*** -0.0015*** -0.0005
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0004)
ln(1+zip code distance) -0.0005 -0.0004 -0.0006
(0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0012)
ln(Abs. Diff in # of Ties to Other VC Firms) -0.0013*** -0.0004*** 0.0005***
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0001)
ln(Abs. Diff in # of Syndications) 0.0013*** 0.0006** 0.0005*
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0002)
ln(Abs. Diff in Asset Under Mngmt.) 0.0016*** 0.0010*** 0.0014***
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
ln(Abs. Diff in # Total $ Invested) 0.0014*** 0.0008*** 0.0002
(0.00018) (0.0002) (0.00017)
ln(Abs. Diff in # Industry HHI) -0.0125*** -0.0109*** -0.0114***
(0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008)
ln(Abs. Diff in # State HHI) -0.0215*** -0.0145*** -0.0114***
(0.0009) (0.0008) (0.0008)
ln(Abs. Diff in # % IPO or Merger) -0.0004 0.0019*** 0.0026***
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.00030)
N of observations 7,416,940 7,416,940 7,416,940
N of clusters 1,338,161 1,338,161 1,338,161
Rsquare 26.42% 26.61% 27.14%
Heteroskendasticity robust standard errors, clustered by pair VC firm i and firm j, in parentheses
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1
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Table 1.7: OLS of Number of Pair Syndication on Common Connections withpair fixed effects
This table shows the results of an OLS regression where the dependent variable is the number of times a given pair of VC firms
syndicate in year t. The unit of observation is a pair of VC firms a firm i, firm j and year t combination. In Column 1, the main
independent variable is an indicator =1 if the pair shares at least one common connection in the last 10 years and 0 otherwise.
In Column 2, the independent variable of interest is the logarithm of 1 plus the number of common connections in the last 10
years between the two firms. In Column 3, the independent variable of interest is the logarithm of 1 plus the normalized number
of common connections in the last 10 years between the two firms. A constant term, year indicator variables and the VC firms
pair dummies are included but not shown in the table. OLS regression coefficients are shown in the table and standard errors
are heteroskedasticity robust and clustered by the pair of VC firms.
Variables # of Syndication # of Syndication # of Syndication
I(Common Connections) 0.006380***
(Past 10 yrs) (0.00023)
ln(1+ # of Common Connections) 0.013770***
(Past 10 yrs) (0.00029)
ln(1+ Norm. # of Common Connections) 1.336010***
(Past 10 yrs) (0.07195)
ln(1+# of Rounds Pair Syndicated ) -0.371364*** -0.380749*** -0.383410***
(0.00565) (0.00574) (0.00582)
ln(1+# of Companies with Successful exit) 0.381747*** 0.375344*** 0.361359***
(the Pair syndicated) (0.01005) (0.01008) (0.00976)
I(Both Firms Invested in Same Market) 0.004542*** -0.000492* 0.003638***
(0.00027) (0.00026) (0.00033)
ln(1+zip code distance) -0.000511 -0.000446 -0.000604
(0.00116) (0.00116) (0.00116)
ln(Abs. Diff in # of Ties to Other VC Firms) -0.001074 *** 0.000045 0.000245
(Past 10 yrs) (0.00020) (0.00019) (0.00019)
ln(Abs. Diff in # of Syndications) 0.001295*** 0.000733*** 0.000914***
(0.00026) (0.00026) (0.00026)
ln(Abs. Diff in Asset Under Mngmt.) 0.001532*** 0.000784*** 0.001217***
(0.00021) (0.00021) (0 .00021)
ln(Abs. Diff in # Total $ Invested) 0.001374*** 0.000791*** 0.000640 ***
(0.00018) (0.00018) (0.00018)
ln(Abs. Diff in # Industry HHI) -0.012542*** -0.011057*** -0.012234***
(0.00082) (0.00082) (0.00082)
ln(Abs. Diff in # State HHI) -0.021702*** -0.015551*** -0.01689***
(0.00086) (0.00086) (0.00086)
ln(Abs. Diff in # % IPO or Merger) -0.000418 0.001999*** 0.001189***
(0.00030) (0.00029) (0.00030)
N of observations 7,416,940 7,416,940 7,416,940
N of clusters 1,338,161 1,338,161 1,338,161
Rsquare 26.42% 26.53% 26.57%
Heteroskendasticity robust standard errors, clustered by pair VC firm i and firm j, in parentheses
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1
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firm in another state for any two VC firms. The first-stage regression in our IV models predicts the extent
of networking in the market as a function of the instruments. Column 2 and column 4 of Table 1.8 report
the estimates, which suggest that the model appears to be well specified: The R2s exceed 60%, and the
partial R2s contributed by the IVs exceed 50%. In addition, the F-statistics are significantly greater than
the critical values of the weak instruments test at the 5% level suggested by Stock and Yogo (2005). The
estimated effect of common connections on predicted number of syndications is also smaller in the IV model
than the one estimated by both the OLS and OLS with pair fixed effects models. The model includes year
fixed effects and the standard errors are heteroskedasticity robust and clustered by pair. In Table 1.8 and
Table 1.9, Column 1 reports the regression results with IV1, Column 3 reports the regression results with
IV2; and Column 6 reports the regression results with both IV2 and IV1.
Since the over identification test suggests we reject the null hypothesis that both of IVs are valid, I applied
a 2-staged least squares regression with two IVs (average common connections and average degrees) formed
using two methods separately. The IVs formed using method 1 do not pass the over identification test, which
is the average common connections and average degrees of VC firms that share common connections other
than the particular VC pair. IVs formed using method 2 pass the over identification test with a k-square
of 1.50 and a p-value of 0.2203, whereas IVs generated by method 2 are the average common connections
and average degrees of similar VC firms in another state satisfying certain conditions as discussed earlier.
Considering the validity of the instrumental variables, we use the instrumental variables generated by method
2. Empirical results are reported in Table 1.9 and Table 1.10.
Table 1.9 reveals that sharing one more common connection formed in the past 5 years increases the pre-
dicted number of syndications by 0.0028 compared to the predicted number of syndications evaluated at the
mean number of common connections; Table 1.10 suggests that sharing one more common connection built
in past 10 years increases the predicted number of syndications by 0.0022 compared to the predicted number
of syndications evaluated using the mean number of common connections. The coefficients of geometrical
proximity are approximately -0.0027, which indicates one standard deviation increase in the log distance
between any two VC firms decreases the predicted number of syndications by 0.0015. The estimated effect
of common connections are not only statistically significant but are also relatively economically significant
compared to the average number of syndications between two firms 0.0184 and the effect of geographical
distance 0.0015. Comparing the coefficients of common connections on the number of syndications in the
models with and without IVs, the failure to account for endogeneity leads to overestimation of the effect
of common connections on the syndication decisions of two firms. The F-statistics and partial R squares
all suggest that the 2-stage least squares model with IVs formed according to method 2 are well specified.
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Overidentification tests also indicate that we retain the null hypothesis the IVs generated using method
2. Consistent with previous work, VC firms tend to cooperate when they have same level of investment
experience in terms of industry and local concentration (Lerner, 1994a,b). Additionally, firms tend to seek
partners that are different along the dimension of cooperating networks: syndication history and amount
of social ties to other firms. Such evidence is consistent with a resource sharing motive for syndication,
whereby firms seek out partners with complementary resources to their own that they lack, as suggested by
Hochberg et al. (2015).
Having controlled for endogeneity and firm characteristics, empirical evidence is consistent with the
hypothesis that common connections are an important factor when VC firms make syndication decisions
and sharing common connections facilitates future cooperation.
1.6.2 Common Connections and the Success of Syndicates
Indirect ties as social collateral are posited to improve the performance of portfolio companies, since
the potential loss of valuable relationships motivates them to offer promising deals and to provide valuable
service to portfolio companies. The first complication is that of measuring the success of a start-up company.
In the ideal setting, portfolio company performance is assessed directly by measuring the market values or
the internal rate of return (IRR) on an investment. However, we do not observe the market price of
private companies and they are not obligated to disclose their IRR. Portfolio company success is measured
indirectly using information about whether investments receive follow-on funding (Gompers and Lerner,
2006) and whether they exit via IPO or sale Gompers and Lerner (1999, 2000); Sørensen (2007); Hochberg
et al. (2007). To account for reverse causality, that is, the success of two cooperating firm’ then encourages
them to syndicate with each other’s “friends”, the present study uses the past 5 years and 10 years of
syndication history to obtain the common connections between any pair of VC firms. However, there may
be some unobserved characteristics (e.g. complementary skills) that improve the performance of the portfolio
company they venture-back, and which makes their shared performance consistently positive. As a result,
the two VC firms are better connected and share more common connections. As an attempt to eliminate
endogeneity, we employ a 2-staged least squares regression with IVs formed by method 2.
The first dependent variable of interest is the interim success denoted as I (Round Success). Modeled
on the literature, I (Round Success) is an indicator denoting another round of follow-on funding or the
achievement of an exit via IPO or later acquisition, and it takes on the value 0 if the investment is liquidated.
The independent variable of interest in explaining investment success is a measure of common connections
between the VC firms investing in the round. An indicator I (Connected Syndicate), takes the value of 1 if
35
any pair of VC firms in the group share at least a common connection over the prior 5 years and 10 years and
equals 0 otherwise. The number of common connections and the normalized number of common connections
measures the strength of indirect ties between two VC firms.
OLS regression results are reported in Table 1.11 and Table 1.12. All else being equal, syndicates with
common connections are associated with a higher probability of follow-on funding as compared to those
without any common connections. The probability of follow-on funding increases by 7.8% when at least one
pair of member firms share some common connections over the past 5 years; the probability of follow-on
funding increases by 7.6% when at least one pair of member firms shares some common connections over the
past 10 years. This increase is statistically significant at the 1% level, and given the mean interim success rate
of of 83% it is also economically meaningful. Thus, sharing common connections among syndicate members
improves the portfolio companies’ probability of receiving follow-on funding. To further understand the
mechanism for such an effect, I categorize the different rounds of funding into distinct stages, including
Early/Seed, Expansion and Later stage. The marginal effect of common connections on follow-on funding
across the stages is statistically and economically significant in the early/seed stage. It appears that the
association between common connections and interim success is stronger in the Early/Seed stage of an
investment. It is consistent with the prediction that common connections discourage VC firms from offering
lemon projects to one another, especially when there is more uncertainty surrounding the investment in its
Early/Seed stage. In addition, Early/Seed stage investments are risky and demand more monitoring and
consulting from VC firms, thus this empirical evidence is also consistent with the prediction that common
connections motivate VC firms to exert more effort in the management of startup companies.
To account for endogeneity, I also use the two staged least squares model with instruments to assess
how common connections increase the chance of receiving follow on funding. Table 1.13 and Table 1.14
suggest that sharing one more common connection over the past 5 years on average increases the chance of
follow on funding by 2.6% compared to the probability of follow on funding evaluated at the mean number
of common connections; sharing one more common connection over the past 10 years on average increases
the chance of follow on funding by 2.5% compared to the probability of follow on funding evaluated at the
mean number of common connections. The coefficients are both statistically significant and economically
meaningful. The standard deviations of the effect of common connections are higher in the model with
instruments. Both models with IVs pass the over-identification test and the F-test, thus the models with IVs
are well specified. This evidence provides some support for the hypothesis that common connections ease
the problem of information asymmetry regarding the quality of the entrepreneurial company and motivates
VC firms to provide valuable service to the start-up company.
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Table 1.13: 2SLS of Round level Success on Syndicate Connectedness with IV
The table reports the results of the two staged least square regression of Round level Success on Syndicate
Connectedness in the past 5 years with IVs generated according to similar VC firm’s common connections and
degrees. Year dummy variables are included in the regression but not shown. Heteroskendasticity robust
standard errors are clustered two-way by year and industry. The over identification test returns a score χ2
=2.922 with a p-value of 0.0874. The F statistics is 80000 and above the relevant critical value suggested by
Stock and Yogo (2005), thus we reject the null hypothesis that the set of instruments are weak.
Variables OLS 2SLS with IV
ln(1+ Avg. # of Common Connections) 0.017943*** 0.020890***
(past 5 Years) (0.00124) (0.00165)
Instruments
ln(1+ Avg. # of Common Connections of Similar VC)
(past 5 Years)
ln(1+ Avg. # of Degrees of Similar VC)
(past 5 Years)
Avg. Asset Under Mngmt. (thousand) 5.6E-6*** 5.8E-6***
(8.7E-7) (9.9E-7)
Avg. Total $ Invested (thousand) 6.2E-7 2.2E-07
(8.3E-7) (8.6E-7)
Avg. % IPO or Merger 0.001343*** 0.001343**
(0.00036) (0.00062)
Avg. ln(1+zip code distance) 0.010082*** 0.009217***
(0.00054) (0.00064)
Avg. State HHI -0.021426** -0.021806***
(0.00855) (0.00762)
Avg. Industry HHI -0.056039*** -0.052560***
(0.01126) (0.01001)
California Indicator 0.017065*** 0.016258***
(0.00319) (0.00319)
Value-Weighted B/M of Public Firms -2.8E-6*** -2.8E-6***
(1.8E-7) (1.3E-7)
ln($ Inflows to VC Industry) 0.008836*** 0.017862*
(0.00318) (0.01103)
Observations 62,840 64,892
# of clusters 23,261 23,261
Rsquare 5.44% 5.44%
Heteroskendasticity robust standard errors, clustered by company, in parentheses
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1
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Table 1.14: 2SLS of Round level Success on Syndicate Connectedness with IV
The table reports the results of the two staged least square regression of Round level Success on Syndicate
Connectedness in the past 10 years with IVs generated according to similar VC firm’s common connections
and degrees. Year dummy variables are included in the regression but not shown. Heteroskendasticity
robust standard errors are clustered two-way by year and industry. The over identification test score χ2 =
0.981994 with a p-value of 0.3217. And the F-statistics is 7.9e+04 and abve the critical value suggested in
Stock and Yogo (2005) Table 1.
Variables OLS 2SLS with IV
ln(1+ Avg. # of Common Connections) 0.015552*** 0.019042***
(past 10 Years) (0.00116) (0.00138)
Instruments
ln(1+ Avg. # of Common Connections of Similar VC)
(past 10 Years)
ln(1+ Avg. # of Degrees of Similar VC)
(past 10 Years)
Avg. Asset Under Mngmt. (thousand) 5.5E-6*** 5.7E-6***
(8.7E-7) (8.9E-7)
Avg. Total $ Invested (thousand) 7.9E-6 2.8E-6
(8.3E-7) (8.3E-7)
Avg. % IPO or Merger 0.001345*** 0.001345***
(0.00036) (0.00037)
Avg. ln(1+zip code distance) 0.010365*** 0.009247***
(0.00054) (0.00059)
Avg. State HHI -0.021248** -0.021727**
(0.00855) (0.0085)
Avg. Industry HHI -0.057207*** -0.052717***
(0.01127) (0.01114)
California Indicator 0.017538** 0.016542***
(0.00319) (0.00314)
Value-Weighted B/M of Public Firms -2.8E-06*** -2.8E-06***
(1.8E-7) (1.5E-7)
ln($ Inflows to VC Industry) 0.008269*** 0.014927
(0.00318) (0.01033)
Observations 64,892 62,840
# of clusters 23,261 23,261
Rsquare 5.41% 5.40%
Heteroskendasticity robust standard errors, clustered by company, in parentheses
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1
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Table 1.15: OLS of Exit Outcome on Syndicate Connectedness
The table reports the results of the OLS regression of Exit Outcome on Syndicate Connectedness in the
past 5 years. We use the start-up company’s first round venture capital funding. Year dummy variables
are included in the regression but not shown in the Table. Heteroskendasticity robust standard errors are
clustered two-way by year and industry.
Variables I(IPO/Sale) I(IPO) I(Sale)
I(Common Connections) -past 5 yrs 0.058201*** 0.028186*** 0.054200***
(0.01239) (0.00912) (0.01262)
Avg. Asset Under Mngmt. 1.2E-5* 6.8E-6** 8.2E-6
(6.3E-6) (3.2E-6) (5.1E-6)
Avg. Total $ Invested 7.1E-6** 8.4E-5 6.0E-6***
(3.7E-6) (2.2E-6) (3.1E-6)
Avg. % IPO or Merger 0.002372*** 0.00059 0.002269***
(0.00038) (0.00062) (0.00023)
Avg. ln(1+zipcode distance) 0.005490*** 0.002613** 0.004733***
(0.00160) (0.00111) (0.00149)
Avg. State HHI -0.066927*** -0.029300** -0.063591***
(0.01927) (0.01150) (0.01865)
Avg. Industry HHI -0.021230 -0.022351 -0.019017
(0.03015) (0.01769) (0.02822)
California Indicator 0.038199** 0.013709** 0.038539***
(0.01389) (0.00579) (0.01379)
Value-Weighted B/M of Public Firms -3.1E-6*** -2.4E-7 -3.2E-6***
(6.1E-7) (2.5E-7) (6.2E-7)
ln($ Inflows to VC Industry) -0.058880*** -0.079048*** -0.026248***
(0.00827) (0.00588) (0.00727)
Observations 20,004 20,004 20,004
Clusters Year-Industry Year-Industry Year-Industry
Rsquare 4.95% 9.20% 2.79%
Heteroskendasticity robust standard errors, clustered two-way by year and industry, in parentheses
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1
According to Table 1.11, Table 1.12, Table 1.13 and Table 1.14, companies funded by VC firms with more
assets under management and more experience, are more likely to experience an interim success. Companies
funded by VC firms with more successful investment histories also enjoy a better chance of interim success,
echoing the results of other authors (Kaplan and Schoar, 2005). The coefficients of value-weighted book-
to-market ratios are negative and statistically significant. Low book-to-market ratios in an industry are
associated with better investment opportunities (Tobin, 1969) and thus better deal flows for VC firms,
which should be associated with higher probability of follow-on funding for startup companies. This finding
is consistent with Bhagwat (2011). However, the coefficients on capital flows into VC funds are positive and
not statistically significant at the 1% level.
In addition to intermediate success, the second dependent variable of interest is the measure of ultimate
success of a venture-backed startup company, denoted by I(IPO/Sale). I(IPO/Sale) is an indicator of an exit
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Table 1.16: OLS of Exit Outcome on Syndicate Connectedness
The table reports the results of the OLS regression of Exit Outcome on Syndicate Connectedness in the
past 10 years. We use the start-up company’s first round venture capital funding. Year dummy variables
are included in the regression but not shown in the Table. Heteroskendasticity robust standard errors are
clustered two-way by year and industry.
Variables I(IPO/Sale) I(IPO) I(Sale)
I(Common Connections) -past 10 yrs 0.055915*** 0.027429*** 0.052386***
(0.01266) (0.00934 ) (0.01266)
Avg. Asset Under Mngmt. 1.2E-5* 6.7E-6* 8.0E-6
(6.3E-6) (3.2E-6) (5.2E-6)
Avg. Total $ Invested 7.2E-6* 8.9E-5 6.1E-6*
(3.7E-6) (2.3E-6) (3.1E-6)
Avg. % IPO or Merger 0.002370*** 0.000586 0.002267***
(0.00037) (0.00062) (0.00023 )
Avg. ln(1+zipcode distance) 0.005631*** 0.002646** 0.004832***
(0.00168) (0.00120) (0.00151)
Avg. State HHI -0.066926*** -0.029300** -0.063590***
(0.01925) (0.01149) (0.01863)
Avg. Industry HHI -0.021847 -0.022574 -0.019523
(0.02998) (0.01771) (0.02811)
California Indicator 0.038594** 0.013879** 0.038888***
(0.01388) (0.00578) (0.01378)
Value-Weighted B/M of Public Firms -3.1E-6*** -2.4E-7 -3.2E-6***
(6.1E-7) (2.5E-7) (6.2E-7)
ln($ Inflows to VC Industry) -0.058937*** -0.079074** -0.026300***
(0.00824) ( 0.00587) (0.00725)
Observations 20,004 20,004 20,004
Clusters Year-Industry Year-Industry Year-Industry
Pseudo-Rsquare 4.94% 9.19% 2.78%
Heteroskendasticity robust standard errors, clustered two-way by year and industry, in parentheses
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1
42
via IPO or acquisition, and it equals 0 if the startup company is liquidated. Empirical results indicate that
common connections are positively related to a portfolio company’s successful exit, all else being equal (Table
1.15-Table 1.18). According to Table 1.15, a one standard deviation (13505.59) increase in industry-level
book-to-market ratio results in a reduction in the probability of IPO/SALE -4.12% and Sale -4.32%; a one
standard deviation (1.35) increase in the log capital inflows results in a reduction in the probability of an
IPO/SALE -7.94%, IPO -10.66% and Sale -3.54%. These findings are consistent with Gompers et al. (2008)
and Gompers and Lerner (2000), who noted that public market information impacts VC firm investment
decisions when they respond to attractive investment opportunities signaled by public market multiples.
Being located in the state of California increases the portfolio company’s probability of IPO/Sale by 3.82,
that of IPO by 1.37%, that of Sale by 3.85%. Sharing common connections among syndicate members over
the past 5 years is positively associated the probability of the successful exit of startup companies. Sharing
common connections over the past 5 years increases the probability of IPO/Sale by 5.82%, that of IPO by
2.82%, that of Sale by 5.42%. The effect of common connections is economically meaningful compared to
the magnitude of effect of B/M ration, capital inflow to VC fund and being located in California. Thus, the
positive effect of common connections over the past 5 years is both statistically and economically significant.
Empirical results echo those in Table 1.16 using the common connections formed over the past 10 years in
cooperating networks. In addition, companies funded by VC firms with higher levels of past success are more
likely to exit via IPO or sale, which confirms the findings of Kaplan and Schoar (2005). However, while the
marginal effect is positive for IPO only exits, it is not even significant at the 10% level.
To account for endogeneity, I employ a 2-stage least squares model with IVs to study how the strength
of common connections may affect the successful exit of a portfolio company. Empirical results in Table
1.17 and 1.18 suggest that all else being equal, sharing one more common connection in the past 5 years
increases the probability of exit via IPO/Sale by 1.23%, IPO by 0.61% and SALE by 1.18%; sharing one more
common connection formed in the past 10 years increases the probability of exit via IPO/Sale by 0.93%,
IPO by 0.47%, SALE by 0.89%. According to Table 1.17, a one standard deviation (13505.59) increase
in industry-level book-to-market ratio results in a reduction in the probability of IPO/SALE -3.39%, IPO
0.31% and Sale -3.71%. But the coefficient of industry B/M is not statistically significant. The estimated
effect of common connections on the probability of successful exits is economically meaningful compared to
those of public market signals. Thus, the coefficients of the strength of common connections are statistically
and economically significant. The 2-staged least squares model with IVs survive the over-identification tests
and F-tests, suggesting the models are well specified. Empirical evidence implies that both the existence and
strength of common connections are positively associated with the successful exit of portfolio companies,
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which supports the hypothesis that common connections improve the performance of portfolio companies.
1.6.3 Common Connections and Value Added Service
This section investigates whether sharing common connections motivates syndicate members to provide
valuable service to the entrepreneurial company. Our experimental design is modeled on the work of Hochberg
et al. (2007). I include only the second-round deals whose lead syndicate firm is not among the first-round
investors. I exclude the deals whose second round lead syndicate VC firm shares common connections
with its first-round lead investors. Since the new second-round lead syndicate member did not originate
the deal and did not share any common connection with the first-round lead VC, the estimated effects of
common connections that the second-round lead VC shares with other syndicate members in the second
round presumably captures the value of services added to the portfolio company instead of better access to
deal flows. Of the 17,336 second-round investments in our data set, 3473 satisfy the imposed criteria.
I estimate a start-up company’s probability of a successful exit as a function of average of lead syndicate
member’s common connections with others syndicate members with instrumental variables. Regression
results are shown in Table 1.19 and 1.20. We argue that the models with IVs are well specified as they pass
the overidentification and F-tests. Empirical results suggest that sharing one more common connection over
the preceding 5 years increases the probability of an IPO/Sale by 0.7% and that of IPO by 1.1%; sharing
one more connection over the preceding 10 years increases the probability of an IPO/Sale by 0.67% and that
of an IPO by 1%. The coefficients are all statistically significant at at least the 5% level. According to Table
1.19, a one standard deviation increase in industry B/M ratio decreases the probability of an IPO/Sale by
2.7% and a one standard deviation increase in capital flows to VC funds decreases the probability of an
IPO/Sale by 7%. The effects of common connections on company performance are economically meaningful
compared to the effects of public market signals.
The positive coefficients estimated for common connections indicate that a company’s chance of a suc-
cessful exit increase as lead syndicate members share more common connections with other members. The
evidence supports the hypothesis that with multiple relationships at stake, VC firms endeavor to provide
value added service to start-up companies.
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1.7 Robustness
1.7.1 Possibility of Losing Multiple Relationships
The cost of deviation is punishment for VC firms fail a portfolio company as a lead syndicate member,
the punishment is in the form of reduced syndication opportunities with shared intermediate firms (common
connections). If common connections act as social collateral and facilitate pair syndication and motivate VC
firms to add valuable service to their portfolio companies. We should observe that after having funded a
failed business as a lead syndicate member, the likelihood of syndication between commonly connected VCs
and the lead syndicate members drops. I perform a difference-in-differences test, comparing the change over
time in the probability that a prior lead syndicate member is invited to co-invest with another VC which is
commonly connected with the lead and non-lead syndicate members in a previous syndication, as a function
of whether the lead syndicate member failed the business or not in the previous syndication. The unit of
observation is thus all potential VC firm pair I and J in year t. The dependent variable is the change in
the probability that firm I is invited to join a venture lead-managed by another VC firm in its market. The
main dependent variable of interest is an indicator set equal to one if firm I co-invested with another VC
firm during year t. I test the hypothesis that the VC firms that are connected with both lead and non-lead
syndicate members react by not offer any syndicates to the (lead) syndicate member for a period of time
after the (lead) syndicate member’s failure in a syndicate. I also control for the investment history between
any two VC firms, as well as their geographical distance, relative difference of investment style and their
differences in characteristics. Table 1.21 and 1.22 report the results of the difference in difference regression.
Table 1.21 accounts for syndicate failures in the past 2-4 years and syndication networks developed over
the previous 5 years. In the first column of Table 1.21, the probability that a VC firm is invited to invest
in a deal lead by a common connection j dropped by 9% if the VC firm participated in a failed syndication
in the past 2-4 years and shared the common connection j with another syndicate member in the current
syndication. And the drop is statistically significant. If VC firm J is a common connection of VC firm I
and another VC firm, then the chance that firm I and J syndicate is increased by 0.5% (significant at .05).
According to the second column of Table 1.21, the probability that a VC firm is invited to invest in a deal
lead by a common connection J drops by 8.98% if the VC firm failed as a lead syndicate member in the past
2-4 years and shared the intermediate firm J with another syndicate member in the failed venture. And the
drop is also statistically significant. The third column of Table 1.21 compares the consequences of a VC
firm that failed as a lead and non-lead syndicate member. The probability of being invited by a common
connection decreases by 3.90% if a VC failed as a lead syndicate member; the probability of being invited by
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Table 1.21: Failure and Common Friends syndication
Table shows the results of the difference in difference OLS regression with Year dummy variables. Failures happened in the past
2-4 years. The standard errors are clustered two-way by firm i and firm j.
Variables I(Pair Syndication) I(Pair Syndication) I(Pair Syndication)
Failure_Com_Friend_I 0.005788**
(past 5 years) (0.00262)
Failure_As_Lead_Com_Friend_I -0.002031 -0.002940
(0.00325) (0.00312)
Failure_As_non Lead_Com_Friend_I 0.007335***
(0.00247)
Failure_Com_Friend_I*Lead_INC -0.090060***
(0.00529)
Failure_As_Lead_Com_Friend_I*Lead_INC -0.090220*** -0.038972***
(0.00611) (0.00505)
Failure_As_non Lead_Com_Friend_I*Lead_INC -0.069960***
(0.00456)
Lead_INC 0.943578*** 0.940055*** 0.942978***
(0.00335) (0.00367) (0.00341)
I(Common Connections) 0.004735*** 0.004765*** 0.004736***
(past 5 years) (0.00023) (0.00024) (0.00023)
ln(1+# of Rounds Pair Syndicated ) 0.022783*** 0.023512*** 0.023110***
(0.00183) (0.00174) (0.00184)
ln(1+# of Companies with Successful exit Pair syndicated ) 0.074403*** 0.074068*** 0.074370***
(0.00370) (0.00367) (0.00369)
I(Both Firms Invested in Same Market) 0.001147*** 0.001144*** 0.001138***
(0.00016) (0.00016) (0.00016)
Avg. ln (1+zip code distance) -0.000663*** -0.000665*** -0.000665***
(7.9E-5) (7.9E-5) (7.9E-5)
ln(Abs. Diff in Degree) 0.000679*** 0.000678*** 0.000676***
(past 5 years) (9.9E-5) (9.9E-5) (9.9E-5)
ln(Abs. Diff in # of Syndications) 0.000313*** 0.000320*** 0.001066***
(9.0E-5) (9.1E-5) (0.00019)
ln(Abs. Diff in Asset Under Mngmt.) 0.000356*** 0.000361*** 0.000358***
(6.7E-5) (6.7E-5) (6.7E-5)
ln(Abs. Diff in # Total $ Invested) 3.3E-5 3.5E-5 3.5E-5
(9.1E-5) (9.1E-5) (9.1E-5)
ln(Abs. Diff in # Industry HHI) -0.003282*** -0.003298*** -0.003285***
(0.00042) (0.00043) (0.00042)
ln(Abs. Diff in # State HHI) -0.005590*** -0.005633*** -0.005597***
(0.00071) (0.00071) (0.00071)
ln(Abs. Diff in # % IPO or Merger) 0.000779*** 0.000772*** 0.000778***
(0.00027) (0.00027) (0.00027)
Observations 7,416,940 7,416,940 7,416,940
Rsquare 52.95% 52.94% 52.95%
Heteroskendasticity robust standard errors, clustered two-way by VC firm i and firm j, in parentheses
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1
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Table 1.22: Failure and Common Friends syndication
Table shows the results of the difference in difference OLS regression with Year dummy variables. Failures occurred in the past
5-7 years. The standard errors are clustered two-way by firm i and firm j.
Variables I(Pair Syndication) I(Pair Syndication) I(Pair Syndication)
Failure_Com_Friend_I -0.024346***
(past 10 years) ( 0.00309)
Failure_As_Lead_Com_Friend_I -0.021179*** -0.005580
(0.00375) (0.0043)
Failure_As_non Lead_Com_Friend_I -0.024659***
(0.00417)
Failure_Com_Friend_I*Lead_INC -0.092924***
(0.00771)
Failure_As_Lead_Com_Friend_I*Lead_INC -0.093863*** -0.047186***
(0.00750) (0.00654)
Failure_As_non Lead_Com_Friend_I*Lead_INC -0.060383***
Lead_INC 0.937725*** 0.002694*** 0.937356***
(0.00378) (0.00018) (0.00384)
I(Common Connections) 0.002659*** 0.002694*** 0.002656***
(past 10 years) (0.00018) (0.00018) (0.00018)
ln(1+# of Rounds Pair Syndicated ) 0.026353*** 0.025280*** 0.026316***
(0.00169) (0.00164) (0.00167)
ln(1+# of Companies with Successful exit Pair syndicated ) 0.074320*** 0.074009*** 0.074297***
(0.00373) (0.00367) (0.00372)
I(Both Firms Invested in Same Market) 0.001653*** 0.001683*** 0.001653***
(0.00016) (0.00016) (0.00016)
Avg. ln (1+zip code distance) -0.000660*** -0.000660*** -0.000659***
(8.2E-5) (8.2E-5) (8.2E-5)
ln(Abs. Diff in Degree) 0.000679*** 0.000587*** 0.000571***
(past 10 years) (9.9E-5) (0.00011) (0.00011)
ln(Abs. Diff in # of Syndications) 0.000571*** 0.000305*** 0.000312***
(0.00011) (9.9E-5) (9.9E-5)
ln(Abs. Diff in Asset Under Mngmt.) 0.000445*** 0.000444*** 0.000445***
(7.1E-5) (7.0E-5) (7.1E-5)
ln(Abs. Diff in # Total $ Invested) 0.000138 0.000131 0.000138
(0.00010) (0.00010) (0.00010)
ln(Abs. Diff in # Industry HHI) -0.003559*** -0.003576*** -0.003559***
(0.00044) (0.00044) (0.00044)
ln(Abs. Diff in # State HHI) -0.006436*** -0.006405*** -0.006437***
(0.00076) (0.00076) (0.00076)
ln(Abs. Diff in # % IPO or Merger) 0.000604** 0.000613** 0.000608**
(0.00028) (0.00028) (0.00028)
Observations 7,416,940 7,416,940 7,416,940
Rsquare 52.93% 52.91% 52.93%
Heteroskendasticity robust standard errors, clustered two-way by VC firm i and firm j, in parentheses
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1
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a common connection decreases by 7.00% if a VC failed as a non-lead syndicate member. An OLS regression
of the probability of syndication between a VC and a common connection based on past syndication failure
demonstrates that the probability of syndication between a VC and a common connection is not negatively
associated with past syndication failure, which is not shown in the tables. This result suggests that the drop
in pair syndication between a VC and a common connection is less likely correlated with investment or IPO
cycle. Table 1.22 displays the difference in difference regression results accounting for syndicate failures in
the past 5-7 years and syndication networks developed over the past 10 years. Results also suggest a drop in
the probability of syndication between an intermediate VC firm (common connection) and a VC firm that has
failed a syndication as a lead or non-lead syndication member in the past 5-7 years, which indicates that the
drop is unlikely a consequence of IPO cycle. But we observe that the probability of syndication between a VC
and a common connections is negatively associated with past syndication failure. In addition, coefficients
on common connections are still positive and statistically and economically significant. Accounting for
syndicate failures in the past 2-4 years and 5-7 years, respectively, difference-in-difference regressions yield
similar results, providing evidence that if VC firms have failed in a syndicate, rumors that they did not
offer promising deals or provide valuable service to a portfolio might spread; thus they would lose multiple
relationships with the intermediate VC firms (or common connections) as a result and the “punishment” is
unlikely a result of investment or IPO cycle.
1.7.2 How does Firm Size Influence the Effect of Common Connections on
Syndication Strategy
There are alternative explanations for positive associations between common connections and pair syn-
dication. Since it is more likely that experienced VC firms have privileged information about deal quality
and superior skills in funding portfolio companies, experienced and reputable VC firms are sought after as
syndicate members. Experienced VC firms tend to have better syndication networks with a long history of
investments in the VC industry, and thus share more connections with other VC firms, on average. It is also
possible that the positive effect of common connections on pair syndication is a result of VC firms trying
to form links with experienced VCs through “friends of friends” and that this is more significant than the
pressures of “social collateral”. In order to explore this hypothesis we categorize VC firms according their
assets under management, which is a crucial sign of experience and reputation.
In order to evaluate how firm size determine the effects of common connections on syndication decision.
I put active VC firms in order according to firm size and study two VC firm syndication decisions by their
size. Active VC firms are defined as having active VC funds. A VC fund is also defined as active if it is
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Table 1.23: All Potential VC Pairs by 5*5 Size Groups
The table reports the number of VC firms falls into each of five groups, where VC firms are grouped into
quartiles according to their sizes each year. The colomn is the maximum size group for a given pair and the
row reprensents the minimum size group for a given pair every year. Larger size groups correspond to VC
firms of larger sizes.
Size Group (quartile) min 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th
max
1st 304,553 304,553
(4.11%) (4.11%)
2nd 598,530 291,054 889,584
(8.07%) (3.92%) (11.99%)
3rd 603,532 589,832 295,448 1,488,812
(8.14%) (7.95%) (3.98%) (20.07%)
4th 599,023 585,996 590,169 291,335 2,066,523
(8.08%) (7.90%) (7.96%) (3.93%) (27.86%)
5th 602,195 588,758 593,247 589,112 294,156 2,667,468
(8.12%) (7.94%) (8.00%) (7.94%) (3.97%) (35.96%)
2,707,833 2,055,640 1,478,864 880,447 294,156 7,416,940
(36.51%) (27.72%) (19.94%) (11.87) (3.97%)
Percentage in parentheses
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Table 1.24: OLS of Number of Pair Syndication on Common Connections by 5*5 Size Groups
The table reports the results of linear regression of number of pair syndication on common connections
in the past 5 years by the VC firm pair’s size groups, where the size groups are obtained by ranking VC
firms according to their sizes every year. Group 1 corresponds to the smallest size group and group 5
corresponds to the greatest size group. The dependent variable is the number of pair syndication in year
t, and the independent variable of interest is log (1+number of common connections). The coefficients of
control variables and year dummies are not shown in the table.
Size Group (quartile) 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th
1st 0.007579***
(0.00227)
2nd 0.005269*** 0.005422***
(0.00098) ( 0.00101 )
3rd 0.004378*** 0.005017*** 0.004635***
(0.00058) (0.00050) (0.00069)
4th 0.005405*** 0.004933*** 0.005830*** 0.007439***
(0.00061) (0.00049) (0.00054) (0.00087)
5th 0.007407*** 0.008115*** 0.010557*** 0.013798*** 0.029819***
(0.00081) (0.00074) (0.00096) (0.00107) (0.00303)
Heteroskendasticity robust standard errors, clustered by the VC firm pair firm i and firm j, in parentheses.
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1
within 10 years of its inception or still actively making investments. Table 1.23 shows that out of 7416940
potential pairs of VC firms in the sample, 36.51% of the pairs have one VC firm that falls in the first
quartile and 35.96% have a VC firm that falls into the fifth quartile. After ranking VC firms by size, I
perform OLS regressions and 2 stage least squares regression to analyze the effect of common connections on
pair syndication decisions, controlling for the pair’s investment history, geographical distance, the relative
difference of their investment styles and other characteristics, such as size, experience, etc.
According to the OLS regression in Table 1.24 and 1.25, the coefficients of the number of common con-
nections developed over the past 5 years on the number of syndications; In general, the predicted probability
of co-investment increases as VC firm sizes increase. The effect of the strength of common connections on
pair syndication is the largest (almost 3%) for the pair of VC firms that are both among the top 20% largest
firms. Using instrumental variables, the effect of common connections on the likelihood of pair syndication
and the number of syndications are all positive and statistically significant. Table 1.26 and 1.27 report
the coefficients of common connections formed in the past 5 years on pair syndications controlling for VC
firm characteristics and year fixed effects. Comparing the 2SLS regression coefficient of the strength of
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Table 1.25: OLS of Number of Pair Syndication on Common Connections by 5*5 Size Groups
The table reports the results of linear regression of number of pair syndication on the common connections
indicator in the past 5 years by the VC firm pair’s size groups, where the size groups are obtained by ranking
VC firms according to their sizes every year. Group 1 corresponds to the smallest size group and group 5
corresponds to the greatest size group. The independent variable is the pair syndication indicator, and the
independent variable of interest is log of 1 plus the number of common connections, which equals 1 if two VC
firms have at least one common connection in the past 5 years and 0 otherwise. The coefficients of control
variables and year dummies are not shown in the table.
Size Group (quartile) 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th
1st 0.005067***
(0.00128)
2nd 0.003996*** 0.003944***
(0.00057) (0.00064)
3rd 0.004023*** 0.004547*** 0.004378***
(0.00046) (0.00041) (0.00053)
4th 0.004476*** 0.004648*** 0.005737*** 0.0078105***
(0.00040) (0.00041) (0.00050) (0.00067)
5th 0.006420*** 0.007247*** 0.009308*** 0.013628*** 0.029917***
(0.00062) (0.00060) (0.00071) (0.00080) (0.0019)
Heteroskendasticity robust standard errors, clustered by the VC firm pair firm i and firm j, in parentheses.
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1
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Table 1.26: 2SLS of Number of Pair Syndication on Common Connections by 5*5 Size Groups
The table reports the results of 2-stage least squares regression of number of pair syndication on common
connections in the past 5 years with instruments by the VC firm pair’s size groups, where the size groups
are obtained by ranking VC firms according to their sizes every year. Group 1 corresponds to the smallest
size group and group 5 corresponds to the greatest size group. The dependent variable is the number of
pair Syndication, and the independent variable of interest is log (1+number of common connections). The
coefficients of control variables and year dummies are not shown in the table.
Size Group (quartile) 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th
1st 0.001705*
(0.00100)
2nd 0.003766*** 0.002259***
(0.00048) (0.00069)
3rd 0.003272*** 0.003470*** 0.002368***
(0.00040) (0.00039) (0.00056)
4th 0.004178*** 0.003510*** 0.004461*** 0.006630***
(0.00036) (0.00036) (0.00042) (0.00062)
5th 0.005686*** 0.006160*** 0.006410*** 0.008471*** 0.004610***
(0.00031) (0.00034) (0.00042) (0.00052) (0.00110)
Heteroskendasticity robust standard errors, clustered by the VC firm pair firm i and firm j, in parentheses.
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1
common connections on the number of syndications 0.0066985, all the coefficients seem to be economically
meaningful. However, all coefficients of common connections are smaller in the 2SLS regression with IVs
than those in the OLS model. For a VC firm that belongs to a fixed minimum size group, effect of common
connections on pair syndication increases as the larger group moves from smaller firms to bigger firms; there
is no size effect as we fix the maximum size group and change the minimum size group. The coefficient
drops substantially for the pair that both belong to the largest size group, the coefficient is 0.0046 in the
2SLS model (Table 1.26) with IVs comparing to 0.0298 (Table 1.24) in the OLS model. Table 1.25 and 1.27
report similar results as Table 1.24 and 1.26. Table 1.28 shows the coefficients of the strength of common
connections developed over the past 10 years on the number of syndications, using the 2SLS model with
instruments and controlling for all relevant VC firm characteristics. We find similar patterns in Table 1.28
as those in Table 1.26, where effects of common connections on pair syndication are both statistically and
economically significant for VC firms that belong either to same size groups or smaller size groups.
These results suggest that there are statistically and economically significant effects for VC pairs that
both belong to the same size group and for those that belong to smaller size groups, which supports the
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Table 1.27: 2SLS of Number of Pair Syndication on Common Connections by 5*5 Size Groups
The table reports the results of 2-stage least squares regression of number of pair syndication on common
connections in the past 5 years with instruments by the VC firm pair’s size groups, where the size groups
are obtained by ranking VC firms according to their sizes every year. Group 1 corresponds to the smallest
size group and group 5 corresponds to the greatest size group. The dependent variable is an indication of
pair syndication, and the independent variable of interest is log (1+number of common connections). The
coefficients of control variables and year dummies are not shown in the table.
Size Group (quartile) 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th
1st 0.002346***
(0.00064)
2nd 0.003342*** 0.002352***
(0.00039) (0.00051)
3rd 0.003280*** 0.003288*** 0.002397***
(0.00032) (0.00033) (0.00042)
4th 0.003614*** 0.003550*** 0.004457*** 0.006866***
(0.00029) (0.00029) (0.00031) (0.00046)
5th 0.005107*** 0.005651*** 0.006562*** 0.009398*** 0.016016***
(0.00026) (0.00027) (0.00030) (0.00034) (0.00055)
Heteroskendasticity robust standard errors, clustered by the VC firm pair firm i and firm j, in parentheses.
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1
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Table 1.28: 2SLS of Number of Pair Syndication on Common Connections by 5*5 Size Groups
The table reports the results of 2-stage least squares regression of number of pair syndication on common
connections in the past 10 years with corresponding instruments by the VC firm pair’s size groups, where
the size groups are obtained by ranking VC firms according to their sizes in year t. Group 1 corresponds to
the smallest size group and group 5 corresponds to the greatest size group in year t. The dependent variable
is the number of pair syndication, and the independent variable of interest is log (1+number of common
connections the pair shares in the past 10 years). The coefficients of control variables and year dummies are
not shown in the table.
Size Group (quartile) 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th
1st 0.002184**
(0.00101)
2nd 0.004122*** 0.002883***
(0.00050) (0.00076)
3rd 0.003687*** 0.004078*** 0.002644***
(0.00042) (0.00043) (0.00057)
4th 0.004565*** 0.004113*** 0.004627*** 0.006224***
(0.00037) (0.00039) (0.00043) (0.00065)
5th 0.006526*** 0.007266*** 0.006681*** 0.008330*** 0.003050**
(0.00034) (0.00039) (0.00046) (0.00057) (0.00129)
Heteroskendasticity robust standard errors, clustered by the VC firm pair firm i and firm j, in parentheses.
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1
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hypothesis that common connections facilitate syndication as social collateral. And such evidence suggests
that the effect of common connections on pair syndication is unlikely to be the result of VC firms seeking
experienced and reputable partners.
1.7.3 Self-selection and Portfolio Company Performance
Previous literature indicates that entrepreneurial companies venture backed by more reputable (Nahata,
2008) and experienced (Sørensen, 2007) venture capitalists are more likely to experience a successful exit.
Furthermore, more experienced VCs with successful investment histories tend to attract funding while raising
money for subsequent funds (Kaplan and Schoar, 2005). Thus, an alternate hypothesis is that VC firms
prefer to co-invest with more experienced VCs that have better information about potential deals and
superior abilities in monitoring and consulting a portfolio company; experienced VC firms are usually the
ones who have been in the industry for a long time, and hence are more likely to share a substantial amount
of connections with other firms.
To study how self-selection may distort regression results, I group first round funding of all portfolio
companies according to the size of participant VC firms. Table 1.29 reports the number of first round funding
in different VC firm size groups. According to Panel A of Table 1.29, 3461 entrepreneurial companies are
venture backed by at least one VC firm that is among the largest 10% VC firms out of 6252 syndicates
in total; in other words, at least 55% of syndicates are funded by at least one of the top 10% largest
firms. Additionally, 28.10% of syndicates have at least one member that falls in the smallest 40% of firms.
Table 1.30, 1.31 and 1.32 report the OLS regression coefficients of common connectedness on exit outcome,
controlling for public market information, capital inflows into the VC industry, California indicators for the
startup company, average participant VC characteristics, average VC geographic distances and year fixed
effects. There is no strong pattern suggesting how firm size changes the coefficients of common connectedness
on exit outcome. However, the coefficients tend to be statistically significant for those syndicates with a VC
syndicate member in the largest 10% of firms.
If the effect of connectedness on exit outcome is solely driven by syndicates venture backed by the
largest 10% VC firms, then the effect of connectedness on exit outcome should vanish when we eliminate all
syndicates containing the largest 10% of VC firms. Table 1.33 reports the 2SLS and OLS regression with and
without instrumental variables using common connections developed over the previous 5 years. As we found
previously, as the industry book-to-market ratio increases, the probability of IPO/Sale or Sale decreases
for start-up companies, supporting the idea that VC firms respond rationally to public market information
(Gompers et al., 2008; Gompers and Lerner, 2000). A one standard deviation increase in the B/M ratio,
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the probability of IPO/Sale dropped by 3.4% and that of SALE dropped by 3.7%. Consistent with evidence
we found previously, the probability of successful exit increases as the average VC size increases and as the
average past IPO ratio increases. When there is one more common connection formed in the past 5 years
shared among VC firms, the probability that the portfolio company launches an IPO or is sold through
M&A increases by 0.9% and the probability that the portfolio company exits via Sale increases by 1%.
These increases are not only statistically significant, but also economically meaningful, compared with the
response to public market information or the effect of common connectedness with all investments of the
top 10% largest VC firms (IPO/Sale:1.23%, IPO: 0.61% and SALE: 1.18%). However, common connections
do not exert an impact on the probability of an IPO without investments by the top 10% largest VC firms.
Similarly, Table 1.34 illustrates that sharing one more common connection developed over the past 10 years
increases the chance of an IPO/Sale by 0.93%, of an IPO by 0.5% and of a SALE by 0.89%; these effects are
statistically and economically significant. In addition, all the 2-staged least squares models with IVs survive
over-identification and F-tests in Table 1.33 and 1.34, suggesting the models are well specified. The empirical
evidence suggests that common connections positively affect the success of the entrepreneurial company and
it is unlikely merely the result of self-selection among VC firms.
1.8 Conclusion
This dissertation investigates social networks in the VC industry. The first study, Chapter 1, focuses on
how the incentive of maintaining social ties among VC firms developed during syndication affects the forma-
tion of syndication partnerships in the future. Using comprehensive data from VentureXpert and employing
instrumental variables, I find empirical evidence suggesting that common connections facilitate future syn-
dication, and improve portfolio company performance, thereby increasing the probability of a subsequent
successful exit. The evidence supports the role of common connections serving as “social collateral”. I also
find evidence of the loss of common connections after a VC firm fails in a syndicate or as a lead syndicate
member. The instrumental variables constructed from similar VC firms from other states help mitigate
the endogeneity confound, and substantially reduce the effects of common connections on pair syndication.
The robustness test demonstrates that the results are unlikely to be driven by VC firms seeking out more
experienced and reputable syndicate members. The analysis adds to the literature by investigating how
the maintenance of valuable social ties influences investment strategy. It also sheds light on the dynamic
evolution of syndication networks as well as the industrial organization of the VC industry.
The findings that indirect ties are important strategic considerations seem to contrast with the lesser
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role of indirect relationships suggested by Hochberg et al. (2007). However, Hochberg et al. (2007) focus
on one single VC’s role as a broker between other VCs while this disseration studies the combined value
of intermediate firms between two VC firms. This contrast leads us to ask an extended question: what
determines the importance of a VC as the “social collateral” between two VC firms. In addition, indirect ties
or common connections are defined on the basis of the intermediate VC firm between two firms. I focus on
the case in which two firms are indirectly connected through one VC firm and exclude the scenario in which
two firms are indirectly connected through “friends of friends.” The latter scenario is more complicated but
deserves further exploration in the future. Moreover, the limitation of the instrumental variables constructed
in this dissertation stems from the fact that the instruments are defined by the same syndication network,
which precludes the complete elimination of endogeneity confounds.
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Chapter 2
Evaluating the Benefits of Educational
Networks
2.1 Introduction
Educational networks among VC firms should be distinguished from the professional partnership networks
discussed above. Educational networks originate from the fund mangers’ educational background. Most
educational connections are formed long before syndication decisions, and this mitigates the endogeneity
issue encountered by studying how syndication networks affect syndication strategies. The purpose of the
second part of the dissertation is to examine the financial returns of higher education in the venture capital
industry. It attempts to disentangle the effect of knowledge and skills obtained from education and that of
the network that venture capital fund managers build based on their educational connections. The study
also attempts to explore whether Master’s degree such as an MBA is more valuable than a Bachelor’s
degree, whether attending a more prestigious school is more valuable, and the degree to which different
educational trajectories contribute to a Venture Capitalist’s success in entrepreneurial projects. Extensive
studies have explored the returns to education in the human capital literature, however, there is a paucity
of work distinguishing the benefit of obtaining knowledge and skills from educational institutions and that
of accessing networks associated with education. The present study attempts to fill the gap in the human
capital literature.
Since the VC industry values fund managers with financial knowledge and significant connections, the
industry should reward managers with more expertise and extensive social network connections. Fund man-
agers use their financial expertise to evaluate, help and co-invest in start-up companies and take advantage
of their connections in selecting the most promising companies to invest in. There are at least two ways in
which the educational network of VC managers contributes to their compensation, with their compensation
mostly determined by the successful exit of the start-up companies in which they invest. Venture capitalists
take advantage of their educational networks while searching for prominent investments and networks help
to disperse information more widely. Both educational connections between entrepreneurial company man-
agers and venture capitalists and those shared by venture capitalists facilitate venture capital fund managers
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in finding promising investment opportunities. Since information regarding the investments is intangible,
without a common context or history, it is difficult to transfer verifiable information among VC firms (Pe-
tersen, 2004). Common educational backgrounds enhance trust thanks to shared personal characteristics
(?), and thus may lower the cost of finding, monitoring and consulting start-up companies in the process
of determining syndication partners and co-managing portfolio companies. After screening an investment
opportunity with promising prospects, venture capital managers utilize their managerial skills and business
knowledge to nurture the portfolio company and help the company to go public or participate in a later
M&A. During this process of co-management with the entrepreneur and other VCs, a VC fund manager’s
education network may help reduce coordination and communication costs and complications. Thus, there
should be a demand for VC fund managers with both business knowledge and well connected networks. On
the other hand, educational institutions are important settings for the acquisition of necessary knowledge and
skills, and for the establishment of social connections. This dissertation hypothesizes that there should not
only be financial rewards from acquiring knowledge but also from building social connections while pursuing
higher education. First, I attempt to distinguish the benefits of the knowledge obtained from educational
institutions and the benefits obtained from networks created while attending these institutions.
Education networks are beneficial in several industries, e.g., mutual funds (Cohen et al., 2008), equities
market (Cohen et al., 2010) and venture capital (Bengtsson and Hsu, 2010; Bhagwat, 2011). Fund managers
and security analysts in these industries are not only to be required to utilize financial expertise but also to
make the best use of their educational network in order to be successful professionals. Therefore, it is crucial
to distinguish the two important benefits from education: knowledge and network. In the VC industry,
fund managers must have proficiency in evaluating a start-up companies, co-managing the company with
its management team and monitoring the company on a regular basis. They employ their networks to iden-
tify promising investment opportunities and investing partners (Cohen et al., 2008, 2010; Bhagwat, 2011).
Managers also make use of strong relationships with institutional investors when pricing and distributing
corporate securities (Cornelli and Goldreich, 2001). Thus, both financial expertise and well-connected net-
works are considered valuable in the industry. Not only do VCs acquire specific knowledge and skills from
education (e.g., college, master’s program, etc.), connections are formed while attending educational insti-
tutions. This research adds to the literature by providing an evaluation of the rewards of education due to
education networks.
Education networks affect professional earnings through several channels in the venture capital industry.
First, it is well known that many jobs are found through social networks (Kaplan and Schoar, 2005; Ioannides
and Loury, 2004; Bian, 1997; Granovetter, 1974) and educational background is one important building block
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in which people establish and maintain social relationships. This paper assumes that educational networks
are exogenously determined and does not attempt to evaluate the benefit of educational institutions to
venture capital managers while they secure a position in venture capital funds. Second, educational networks
may help venture capital fund managers reduce the costs associated with locating potential syndicate partners
and accessing information about promising investment opportunities (Cohen et al., 2008, 2010; Bhagwat,
2011). Thus, educational networks among VC firms may facilitate their ability to screen the quality of
potential deals and funding partners. Manager networks may also help reduce coordination and monitoring
costs between fund managers and start-up founders (Hegde and Tumlinson, 2011; Bengtsson and Hsu, 2010).
On the other hand, manager networks may weaken economic benefits of the tie (Fracassi and Tate, 2012)
by fostering nepotism or by obscuring the objectivity of the two parties.
Syndication is a prominent feature in the VC industry (Lerner, 1994a). Thanks to the prominence of
partnership, this industry is particularly useful for assessing the returns of education and for disentangling
its benefits. Venture capital data sets are significantly different than those employed in previous studies
evaluating the returns on education, as there are multiple observations for each venture capital manager.
The investment rounds with a single funding partner allow us to observe how knowledge and skills obtained
from different degrees might exert different effects on VC manager earnings; while the investment rounds
financed by multiple syndicate members allow us not only to estimate benefits of knowledge but also to
evaluate the different effects of educational networks due to different degrees on manager earnings. Such
unique characteristics of the venture capital industry and syndication enable us to observe multiple levels
of cooperation among VC managers over time, where VC managers utilize their expertise and educational
networks repeatedly. The success of startup companies can again be evaluated by whether the company goes
public or agrees to a merger and acquisition, which is highly positively related with VC manager earnings.
VC managers receive a proportion of the profits generated by the exit of portfolio companies called carry or
carried interest, which is typically approximately 20% of profits (Stowell, 2012) and constitutes a substantial
portion of managers’ earnings.
The rationale for pursuing an advanced degree may be considerably different than the rationale for
obtaining a bachelor’s degree. For instance, an important attribute of the Master of Business Administration
is exposure to a broader business network, while, in contrast, a college education might be more general in
terms of its educational objective. Another important question to examine is whether the financial returns
on education are different for more advanced degrees. As students consider more selective educational
institutions to distinguish themselves, we evaluate whether it is more rewarding in the VC industry to
pursue more selective institutions.
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In sum, the second chapter adds to the literature by shedding light on the evaluation of the financial
advantages of education due to education networks. The contribution is threefold. First, this is the first
study that attempts to examine the returns of higher education by distinguishing the different benefits of
knowledge and skills obtained from education and that of educational ties formed by attending the same
educational institutions. Second, networking is an important advertisement for higher education programs
such as Master of Business Administration programs (MBA). It is important to understand whether the
networking that stems from educational institutions is truly rewarding to the VC industry by assess the
degree to which it improves company performance. Third, this study provides evidence on the contribution
of more prestigious educational institutions to the probability of success for a portfolio company and to a
more privileged and advantageous network.
2.2 Literature Review
This study is relevant to research in education literature. Studies examining the financial returns to
education can be illustrated by the framework of a simple static model that builds on Becker (1967) and
Card (1995), who developed an analytically tractable version of Becker’s static model of schooling (Becker,
1967). Kane and Rouse (1995) use two sets of data: a longitudinal survey that originally sampled 22,652
seniors from the high school class of 1972; and a national longitudinal survey of youth (NLSY), which contains
transcripts, work experience measures, test scores, high school performance, and family background and find
that there are similar returns obtaining two-year and four year college credits. Second, Dale and Krueger
(2011) estimate the monetary return on attending a highly selective college using the College and Beyond
(C&B) Survey linked to Detailed Earnings Records from the Social Security Administration (SSA). The
sample size is small in their study. In order to address selection bias, they use one of the selection-adjusted
models, referred to as the self-revelation model by Dale and Krueger (2002). They find when they adjust
for unobserved student ability by controlling for the average SAT score of the colleges that students applied
to, their estimates of the return on college selectivity fall substantially and are generally indistinguishable
from zero. This dissertation is different than previous studies in the education literature as it is the first to
study the returns on higher education using data in VC industry, which contain multiple observations for
each VC firm manager. It also adds to the education literature by examining the effect of professional social
networks that are established through the pursuit of higher education.
One of the primary issues in characterizing the model of the returns on education include “omitted
variables" and measurement error problems. Since people that enjoy a higher return on education will by
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definition tend to acquire more schooling, a cross-sectional regression of earnings on additional schooling
yields an upward-biased estimate of the average marginal returns to schooling. Instrumental variables such
as siblings, identical twins and family background are proposed to mitigate this problem (Ashenfelter and
Krueger, 1994; Isacsson, 1999). The measurement error in schooling also leads to an asymptotic bias towards
the OLS estimation. Researchers use institutional sources of variation in schooling to evaluate the true causal
effect of education, attributable to such features as the minimum school leaving age, tuition costs, or the
geographic proximity of schools. Empirical studies find that asymptotically unbiased estimates of the causal
effect of education are even higher (Angrist and Krueger, 1995; Bound et al., 1995; Staiger and Stock,
1997). IV estimates of the returns on education based on interventions in the school system are at least 20%
above the corresponding OLS estimates. One criticism is that the marginal return to education for certain
subgroups of the population that are most affected by structural innovations in the education system are
higher than the average marginal advantages afforded by education in the population as a whole (Card).
Conneely and Uusitalo (1998) examine the education and earnings differentials associated with growing up
near a college or university; college proximity is found to have a bigger effect for children of less-educated
parents.
This paper is also related to peer effects in educational institution. Sacerdote (2001) uses a unique data
set to provide strong evidence for the existence of peer effects in student outcomes. He finds that peers have
an impact on grade point average and on decisions to join social groups such as fraternities, but he finds no
such effect in other major life decisions such as choice of college major. Gaviria and Raphael (2001) use a
sample of tenth-graders to assess peer-group influence on the propensity to engage in five activities: drug
use, alcohol use, cigarette smoking, church going, and the likelihood of dropping out of high school. They
find evidence of peer-group effects at the school level for all activities and confirm the findings of previous
research concerning interaction effects at the neighborhood level. This paper does not directly evaluate peer
effects of education in starting a career and landing a position in the venture capital industry.
There are also papers that show evidence of education networks that increase fund manager earnings in
the venture capital and mutual fund industries. The most relevant paper in the venture capital industry is
Bhagwat (2011). Evidence suggests that the educational connections between managers of venture capital
firms can alleviate the search and coordination costs associated with the efforts of organizations to form
economic ties. He finds that two given VC firms are more likely to coordinate if their managers share an
educational connection and that educationally connected portfolio companies are more likely to achieve a
successful exit and experience a shorter time to IPO. Bengtsson and Hsu (2010); Hegde and Tumlinson (2013)
present evidence of social proximity enhancing business partnerships between entrepreneurial companies and
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VC firms. Cohen et al. (2008) find evidence that shared education networks among mutual fund managers
and corporate board members may be important mechanisms for information flow into asset prices.
2.3 Empirical Framework
2.3.1 Data
The data for the analysis is retrieved from Thomson Financial’s Venture Economics/VentureXpert
database and Standard and Poor’s Capital IQ database. Venture capital investment data come from Thom-
son Financial’s VentureXpert data, which covers most of the venture investment data since the early 1960s
(Gompers and Lerner, 1999). Following the existing literature, the sample is constructed by concentrating
on investments in U.S. companies made by U.S. based VC firms between 1980 and 2006 (Kaplan and Schoar,
2005). Since venture capital as an asset class did not attract institutional investors until 1980, I exclude
those investments made before 1980. I also exclude the most recent investments since the success of these
investments is still uncertain and may be unknown. The IPO and merger information for the venture-backed
companies is from Securities Data Corporation’s (SDC) Global New Issues database. I match the VentureX-
pert data with portfolio company exit information using the names of the startup companies. Following the
empirical strategy used by Fershtman and Gandal (2011), the second part of this dissertation only includes
early round investments that are riskier and less predictable (Cochrane, 2005) in order to avoid reverse
causality, since a more successful portfolio company might attract VC firms to join the investment, and
whose managers share the same education background with existing mangers.
Manager education and network data are retrieved from Standard and Poor’s Capital IQ database, which
reports biographical information for top tier professionals of nearly 500,000 public and private companies in
the United States. The Capital IQ database provides a list of professionals affiliated with venture capital
funds and start-up companies. VentureXpert lists venture capital funds and firms that invest in a start-up
company and also lists the board members of a start-up company. The sample includes Venture capital
investment data and manager educational data. Professionals are matched with VC funds that they work
for and with certain entrepreneurial companies they support through VC funds. I also record the educational
information of professionals who serve on the board of start-up companies venture-backed by VC firms.
2.3.2 Schooling and Educational Connections
The use of years of education completed as a measure of schooling has a long history in the United
States (Card, 1995; Angrist and Krueger, 1995). Years of schooling has substantial face validity in the
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US education system. Since manager education and network data used in the present study only includes
top-level managers in the US, the difference in the years of completed education among mangers is best
represented by the degrees those managers obtained. The higher the degree a VC completes, the more years
of education completed. The measure of education is a dummy variable indicating the degrees completed,
such as bachelor’s, master’s and doctorate degree, etc. This dissertation studies the returns on education
for different degrees because VC fund manager compensation is unavailable and we only observe VC fund
level performance in terms of portfolio company performance. The amount of schooling is defined as the
total number of VC fund managers with certain degrees who monitor, consult and co-manage a certain
entrepreneurial company. To account for the fact that it is more likely for a startup company to exit
successfully if the company is venture backed by a more experienced, reputable and larger VC firm, the
number of VC managers with certain degrees are scaled by the total number of VC managers that co-manage
the startup company. Different than longitudinal data used in previous return to education literature, the
data we retrieve from the VC industry consists of multiple observations for each VC manager, as a VC
firm’s repeated investments in different startup companies enable us to observe their financial and business
expertise multiple times.
In addition to the pattern of investment activities of VC firms during the process of syndication with
various VC partners, we also observe VC managers repeatedly utilize their educational networks to screen
promising deals, search for VC partners, coordinate and communicate with other syndicate members and
entrepreneurs, and help their portfolio company to achieve a successful exit. To determine if two professionals
are connected, I use the educational history of each manager from Capital IQ and that of the board members
of a start-up company. Two professionals are defined as educationally connected if they received the same
degree from the same educational institution. Educational connectedness for VC managers that fund a
certain startup company is based on VC firm level since syndication is among various VC firms. Thus,
we employ inter-firm educational connections among VC managers. Since a majority of VC funds have
a life span of ten years, each VC manager is presumed to be employed at a particular firm for the ten
years in which the fund is considered active, following Bhagwat (2011). Modeled on the literature, this
dissertation assumes that VC managers and entrepreneurs who belong to the same educational network are
more likely to communicate with each other and have a relationship than those who belong to different
educational networks. A potentially better measure of connection should take into account the period
in which professionals attend educational institutions. Capital IQ does not report the year of education,
otherwise we could have determined whether the period of attendance overlapped. Capital IQ only recorded
the birth year for a portion of professionals; an alternate measure of educational connectedness between
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professionals is defined as receiving the same degree from the same institution and being born within 5 years
of each other.
The estimation strategy uses repeated syndication among VC firms. Each syndication allows us to
observe manager cooperation with the start-up company board members and managers of other VC firms
who received the same degrees from the same school. There are some assumptions involved. First, this
dissertation assumes that each manager working on a project has equal contribution from their education
in screening promising deals and helping to achieve a successful exit. This is a strong assumption, however,
we do not observe each manager’s duties on a particular project. And this assumption is likely to be valid
because each VC fund has several limited partners, and so every manager should play an important role;
incompetent managers can easily be identified and will be excluded in future VC fund ventures. Second,
when a VC manager engages himself/herself in different projects, their contributions to successful exits
as a result of their educations are assumed to be equal, which means that the same value is added to
a start-up company. It is also assumed that there are equal benefits from information diffusion due to
manager’s educational networks. In order to distinguish the financial returns on education resulting from
educational networks, the first measure of manager education network is an indicator that equals 1 if two
managers from different VC firms share an educational connection and receive the same degree; this measure
is also employed by Cohen et al. (2008); Engelberg et al. (2012); Fracassi (2014); Bhagwat (2011). From
manager-level educational connections, two VC firms are defined as educationally connected in a given year
if a manager employed at one firm went to the same school and received the same degree as a manager
employed by the other firm; a VC firm is considered educationally connected with the start-up founders if
a manager employed at the firm shares an educational connection with at least one founder of the start-up
company. I also include indicators of educational connections contributed by different degrees in the analysis
in order to explore the benefits to educational networks of different degrees. In order to quantitatively assess
the contribution of educational networks to returns on education, a measure of VC firm level educational
connections is calculated as the total number of manager level educational connections from two different
VC firms scaled by all possible manager level educational connections during a syndicate. I include school
dummy variables and school level connection dummy variables to study whether .the returns on education
depend on the prestige and ranking of the educational institutions; ranking is based on US News and World
Report rankings.
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2.3.3 Fund Manager Compensation
The compensation of Limited partners includes three components (Stowell, 2012). The first component,
known as the management fee, contains 2% of the total capital commitment until the end of a 4-5 year
investment horizon and another 2% of unreturned funded capital thereafter. It is payable to general partners
semi-annually. The second component is an incentive payment made to general partners only when certain
benchmark rates of return are achieved by the limited partners. Such benchmark rates of return are usually
the return of capital (e.g. LIBOR, S&P 500) plus preferred returns. The return over the benchmark is split
approximately 80/20 between limited partners and general partners, with the part assigned to the latter
known as carried interest. Carried interest may be paid after private equity funds realize gains when selling
their portfolio companies or be paid following interim distributions, i.e., partial sale preceding an ultimate
sale. The third component of limited partner compensations is preferred returns. Most compensation
arrangements require the preferred return to be paid to limited partners before carried interest applies,
aligning the interests between general partners and limited partners. Two approaches of applying preferred
returns are commonly employed in the industry: the pure preferred rates approach, which applies carried
interest only to profits in excess of a specified rate of return, and the hurdle rates approach, which applies
carried interest only when return exceeds a predetermined hurdle rate (e.g. LIBOR, S&P 500). As a result
of these three components, most of a limited partners’ compensation is determined by the successful exit
and realized profits of the start-up companies in which they invest.
While venture capital fund manager’s annual or daily earnings are not available in either VentureXpert
or Manager education data, manager’s earnings are closely related to whether the entrepreneurial company
successfully goes public or goes through M&A. A substantial part of earnings of VC managers are from a
proportion (20%) of the profits (carry) generated by successful exits of their backed entrepreneurial companies
compared to the annual management fee, which equals 1% - 3% of the fund’s assets under management
(Stowell, 2012). The Venture Economics database does not include detailed information on the fraction of
equity acquired by the VCs or the securities they hold. Data limitations prevent us from computing company
level rates of return or profit. In addition, the exact distribution of carried interest among managers within
a VC fund is unobservable in the data. Thus, absent return data, I use indirect measures of manager’s
earnings. Following Gompers and Lerner (1999, 2000); Brander et al. (2002); Sørensen (2007); Hochberg
et al. (2007), the measure of fund manager compensation from investing in a startup company is calculated
as the likelihood of a portfolio company’s successful exit.
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2.3.4 Summary Statistics
First, I focus on a set of US VC firms in the VentureXpert database listing at least one VC manager’s
educational history. Based on the fact that a majority of funds have a life span of ten years, a manager is
defined as being employed at the VC firm for the ten years a fund with which the manager is associated is
in existence. I was able to obtain employment and educational information on 6289 managers in 1041 Funds
of 753 VC firms from 1980 to 2005, among which there are 2749 managers with their birth years listed. The
753 VC firms participating in 30686 investment rounds involving 7603 companies, which account for at least
50% of the investment rounds and the companies involved in syndicated funding. Table 2.1 documents the
most common educational institutions, degrees, and institution-degree combinations among VC managers.
Almost 25% of managers in the sample received a degree from either Stanford or Harvard University, which
account for a majority of the sample. 53% of managers hold a MBA degree, 23.08% have a master’s degree
and 9.37% received a doctoral degree. Thus, the sample in this study focuses on a population with higher
abilities and more schooling. The two most common institution-degree combinations are Harvard MBA and
Stanford MBA, accounting for 15% of VC managers in the sample. The top 5 ranked universities are defined
as “Harvard”,“Stanford”,“M.I.T”,“Princeton”,“Yale”, determined according to U.S. News and World Report
over the sample period. And Top 5 ranked schools make up 25% of the sample.
Table 2.2 documents summary statistics for the characteristics of VC firms and the exit outcomes of start-
up companies. According to Panel A, a VC firm manages $587.85 million per year and has invested $1205.19
million. Considering the number of firms and managers per year, a VC firm manager manages roughly
$60.56 million annually and has invested $124.16 million on average. Since assets under management and
firm experience are highly negatively skewed, with the median assets under management equaling $150
million dollars and median experience equaling $280.16 million dollars, it appears that a small fraction of
VC firms manage and invest a considerable amount of total VC wealth. The average VC firm is relatively
concentrated in a particular industry and region, as the mean industry and state Herndahls are both above
0.44. On average, 34% of a VC’s investments exited successfully via IPO or sale, which contributes to
a large portion of a VC’s profits, while the remaining businesses are written off or liquidated. Panel B
reports the exit outcomes of startup companies in their first rounds: 14.82% of entrepreneurial companies
in the sample exit via IPO, 39.04% exit via sale, which makes up a total of 44.87% that enjoy a successful
exit outcome. Panel C documents the proportion of IPO outcomes by previous syndication history and
managerial connections, which suggests that the likelihood of exit via IPO is 14.18% with managerial ties
compared to 11.27% without managerial ties when there is no syndication history among VC firms. Table
2.3 documents summary statistics for firm-level managerial connections among VC managers and those
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Table 2.1: Common Educational Institutions and Degrees in Sample (Part I)
Panel A: This panel documents the most commonly found educational institutions and top ranked univer-
sities for the VC managers in the sample where VC managers’ educational information is available. The
unit of observation is a start-up company-manager-university-degree combination, and there are 176353
observations, where 84561 observations have non-missing birth year. There are 965 distinct educational
institutions. A manager may appear more than once depending on the number of degrees she obtained.
Panel B of this table reports the most commonly found degrees out of 6289 (2749 with non-missing birth
year) VC managers whose educational information is available in the sample. The unit of observation is
a start-up company-manager-degree combination. Panel C of this table shows the most commonly found
institution degree combinations of the VC managers in the sample where managers’ educational information
is available. The unit of observation is a start-up company-manager-university-degree combination and and
there are 176353 observations.
N %
Panel A: Educational Institution
Harvard College 25,010 14.18%
Stanford University 18,271 10.36%
Unv. of Pennsylvania 9,088 5.15%
M.I.T 5,645 3.20%
U C Berkeley 4,508 2.56%
Dartmouth College 4,091 2.32%
Northwestern university 3,873 2.20%
Columbia university 3,846 2.18%
Princeton university 3,126 1.77%
Yale university 2,943 1.67%
Panel B: Degrees
Bachelor’s 85,165 93.77%
J.D. 5,374 5.92%
MBA 48,510 53.41%
Master’s 20,965 23.08%
M.D. 2,492 2.74%
Ph.D. 8,513 9.37%
Total company-professionals 90,828
Panel C: Institution and Degree
Harvard MBA 15,874 9.00%
Stanford MBA 7,599 4.31%
Harvard Bachelor 5,674 3.22%
Stanford Bachelor 5,409 3.07%
Univ. of Pennsylvania MBA 4,687 2.66%
Stanford Master 3,556 2.02%
Univ. of Pennsylvania BA 3,296 1.87%
Princeton BA 2,905 1.65%
M.I.T Bachelor 2,735 1.55%
Dartmouth College BA 2,715 1.54%
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Table 2.2: Summary Statistics of VC firms and the Start-up Companies (Part I)
This table documents summary statistics for the characteristics of VC firms and the connectedness and success of
start-up companies where VC managers’ educational information is available. Panel A describes the characteristics
of 1935 VC firms that provide funding to 7603 start-up companies. Panel B of this table shows summary statistics
of the measure of successes of the entrepreneurial companies. The unit of observation is a start-up company in the
first round. Panel C shows the proportion of investments that eventually result in an IPO, broken down
by the presence of a manager-level educational connection within a syndicate and the past syndication
history between syndicate member firms. The unit of observation for eventual exit outcomes (IPO or sale) is a
company, where information about the connections within a syndicate is calculated for the first round of a company’s
investment. And past syndication history is defined as yes if any of the firm pairs in the syndicate have
syndicated together in the past. Panel D of this table reports the characteristics of the educational history of VC
managers. The unit of observation is a start-up company in the first round, where the indicator for the presence
of manager-level connections within a syndicate is calculated for the first round of a company’s investment.
Panel A: Summary statistics of the characteristics of VC firms
N Mean Std Median
Current Assets Under Management ($million) 13,309 587.85 1691.17 150
Total $ Invested ($million) 13,309 1205.19 2326.39 280.16
Industry HHI 13,309 0.4454 0.2096 0.3841
State_HHI 13,309 0.4481 0.2538 0.3764
Propensity to Syndicate 13,309 103.08 186.11 29
% IPO or Mergers 13,309 34.04% 0.2284 33.64%
Panel B: Summary Statistics for Company Success (Company Level)
N Mean Std Median
IPO/Sale 7,603 44.87% 49.74% 0
IPO 7,603 14.82% 35.53% 0
SALE 7,603 39.04% 48.79% 0
Panel C: Proportion of IPO Outcomes by Syndicate Connectedness and Past Syndication History
Past Syndication History
I (Mgr Edu. Conn) No Yes
=1 14.18% 20.67%
=0 11.27% 20.19%
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Table 2.3: Summary Statistics of VC firms and the Start-up Companies (Part II)
This table documents summary statistics for the characteristics of VC firms and the connectedness and success of
start-up companies where VC managers’ educational information is available. Panel A describes the characteristics
of 1935 VC firms that provide funding to 7603 start-up companies. Panel B of this table shows summary statistics
of the measure of successes of the entrepreneurial companies. The unit of observation is a start-up company in the
first round. Panel C of this table reports the characteristics of the educational history of VC managers. The unit
of observation is a start-up company in the first round, where the indicator for the presence of manager-level
connections within a syndicate is calculated for the first round of a company’s investment. Panel D shows
the proportion of investments that eventually result in an IPO, broken down by the presence of a manager-
level educational connection within a syndicate and the past syndication history between syndicate member
firms. The unit of observation for eventual exit outcomes (IPO or sale) is a company, where information about the
connections within a syndicate is calculated for the first round of a company’s investment. And past syndication
history is defined as yes if any of the firm pairs in the syndicate have syndicated together in the past.
Panel D: Summary Statistics for Edu. connection among VC managers (Company Level)
N Mean Std Median
I (Mgr-Mgr Edu Conn) 7,603 0.0980 0.2973 0
I (Mgr-Mgr BA Conn) 7,603 0.0629 0.2429 0
I (Mgr-Mgr MBA Conn) 7,603 0.0816 0.2737 0
I (Mgr-Mgr MA Conn) 7,603 0.0224 0.1480 0
I (Mgr-Mgr JD Conn) 7,603 0.0055 0.0738 0
I (Mgr-Mgr MD Conn) 7,603 0.0029 0.0535 0
I (Mgr-Mgr PHD Conn) 7,603 0.0068 0.0820 0
N (Mgr-Mgr BA Conn) 7,603 0.6251 9.44 0
N (Mgr-Mgr MBA Conn) 7,603 1.8107 28.61 0
N (Mgr-Mgr MA Conn) 7,603 0.1093 2.33 0
N (Mgr-Mgr JD Conn) 7,603 0.0096 0.21 0
N (Mgr-Mgr MD Conn) 7,603 0.0060 0.14 0
N (Mgr-Mgr PHD Conn) 7,603 0.0149 0.31 0
I (Mgr-Board BA Conn) 7,603 0.0940 0.29 0
I (Mgr-Board MBA Conn) 7,603 0.0977 0.30 0
I (Mgr-Board MA Conn) 7,603 0.0186 0.14 0
N (Mgr-Board BA Conn) 7,603 0.1981 0.95 0
N (Mgr-Board MBA Conn) 7,603 0.3881 2.31 0
N (Mgr-Board MA Conn) 7,603 0.0288 0.28 0
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between VC managers and startup company board members. According to Panel D, about 9.80% of the
companies’ first rounds are syndicated by VC firms that share at least one educational tie among VC
managers. Educational connections on the JD, MD and PhD level only account for a tiny portion of the
observations, each portion is less than 1%, respectively. The average number of MBA level managerial
connections among VC firms is around 1.8 per company and the average number of managerial connection
with Bachelor’s degrees is 0.63, while the average number of managerial connections with other degrees is all
less than 0.02. In addition to the evaluation of educational networks among VC managers, I also attempt to
evaluate the benefit of educational networks between VC managers and start-up company executives. About
9.40% and 9.77% of the companies’ first rounds have at least one educational tie with Bachelor and MBA
degrees among VC firm managers and startup company board executives.
2.3.5 Smooth Coefficient Model
Propensity score is a baseline score that effectively reduces the bias caused by nonrandom treatment
assignment. The distribution of observed baseline covariates for treated subjects will converge with that
for untreated subjects, conditional on the propensity score. The number of VC fund managers with certain
degrees that work for a startup company could be endogenously determined by company performance as
well as the strength of managerial educational connections. And there could also be important differences
between the investments with and without educational connections. In order to mitigate the problem caused
by lack of random assignment, this dissertation employs propensity scores to reduce the bias.
Since treatment regimes in this dissertation are the number of managers holding certain degrees and
that of managerial educational connections, etc., which are not binary, I use the generalized propensity
score method suggested by Imai and Van Dyk (2004) to evaluate the causal effects of educational ties.
The advantage of their methods is that we can establish causal effects whether the treatment is categorical,
ordinal, continuous, semicontinuous, or multivariate. As shown in Imai and Van Dyk (2004), we can compute
the distribution of the potential outcomes p{Y (tp} as a weighted average of the within-subclass distributions
with weights set equal to the relative size of the subclass, after subclassifying similar values of propensity
function θ.
p{Y (tp} = ´ p{Y (tp|TA = tp, θ}p(θ)d(θ)1
where Y (tP ) is the potential outcomes; tP is a particular potential treatment.
And then we can compute propensity scores θˆ for each observation and subclassify observations into a
moderate number of subclasses of roughly equal size, where the observations in the same subclasses should
1The formulas is from Imai and Van Dyk (2004) formula (1).
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have the same or similar values of proensity socreθˆ. Thus, we can approximate the distributions as a function
of propensity score.
p{Y (tp} ≈∑Jj=1 pϕˆj (Y (tp|TA = tP )Wj2
where φˆ is the estimate of unkown parameter φ, and Wj is the relative weight of subclass j bassed on
propensity score. Eventually, we can compute
φˆ =
∑J
j=1 φˆj{Y (tp)|TA = tp,X}Wj3
where φˆj is the estimated model parameter in subclass j, and X is a set of control variables.
The causal effect would be a function of estimates of unknown variablesφˆ. Different than subclassification,
where φˆ is fixed in each of several subclasses, smooth coefficient model allowsφˆto vary smoothly as a function
of computing propensity score using a flexible model. Since this study has a linear regression setting with
continuous and ordinal treatment, we use a smooth coefficient model (SCM) that allows the regression
coefficients to vary with the propensity score and fit the model with R package mgcv with penalized regression
splines developed by Simon Wood, following Imai and Van Dyk (2004). In detail, I use generalized additive
model with Gaussian family and identity link to model the conditional distribution of outcome and fit
a smooth coefficient model by letting the causal effect and the intercept vary smoothly as a function of
propensity function (or score).
2.4 Empirical Results
2.4.1 The Value of Educational Networks Among VC managers
To assess the benefits of educational ties in the VC industry, this dissertation includes firm characteristics
as control variables, including firm size, experience, history of successful investments, industry specialization
and geographical concentration. Industry specialization is calculated on the basis of the broad industry
categories as defined by the VentreXpert database: Biotechnology, Communications and Media, Computing,
Medical/Health/Life Science, Non-High-Technology and Semiconductors and Other Electronics. Account-
ing for the location of the startup company, a California dummy variable is included in regressions. As
discussed previously, capital inflows into VC funds and industry book-to-market values are included to ac-
count for public market information and investment opportunities, which could affect the exit outcome of
entrepreneurial companies. Since the compensation of VC fund managers is not directly observable, this
dissertation indirectly measures compensation based on the likelihood of a startup company’s successful exit,
where an exit via IPO or acquisition is an overall measure of success. We focus on first-round investments
2The formulas is from Imai and Van Dyk (2004) formula (2).
3The formulas is from Imai and Van Dyk (2004) formula (3).
82
that are risky and uncertain, and which require the concerted efforts of VC managers in order to ensure the
startup company eventually enjoys a successful exit.
We first test whether educational ties facilitate the successful exit of a startup company when all else is
equal. Table 2.4 reports the results of an OLS regression of the eventual exit outcome on an indicator of
educational connections between two managers from different VC firms in a syndicate.
I(StartupSuccess)jt = β0 + β1IMgr_Conn + β2Avg_Experiecne{Firm} + β3Avg_Size{Firm} + β4Avg_IPO%{Firm}
+ β5IndicatorCalifornia + β6HHI{industry} + β7HHI{state} + β8DealFlow{j′s industry} + β9Opport
Where I(StartupSuccess)jt is the earnings measurement, which takes on a value of 1 if the entrepreneurial
company j backed by certain VC managers at time t goes public or goes through M&A later on; otherwise
it is valued at 0. Avg_Experience{Firm} is the average experience of the VC Firm that manager i belongs
to; Avg_Size{Firm} is the average firm size; Avg_IPO%{Firm} is the average percentage of past IPO
exits resulting from VC firm investments; HHI{industry}, HHI{state} are average herfindahl indexes for
industry and state; DealF low{j′s industry} is the deal flow of the industry that company j belongs at time t;
Opport{j′s industry} is the industry book to market ratio demonstrated by the startup company.
Confirming findings in previous literature, public market signals seem to affect significantly the success
of VC investments. According to Table 2.4, companies funded during times of high average book-to-market
ratios for public companies are associated with a significantly lower probability of an exit via IPO/SALE
or SALE, which is consistent with the conclusions of Gompers et al. (2008) that VC firms rationally re-
spond to attractive investment opportunities signaled by public market shifts. After controlling for VC firm
characteristics, public market signals, location, and time fixed effects, syndicates with manager-manager ed-
ucational connections seem to experience a higher probability of successful exits as compared to first-round
investments with no firm-level education connections, which confirms the empirical results seen in Bhagwat
(2011). The probability of going public or going through a merger and acquisition increases by 4.57% when
at least two managers from two different VC firms share educational ties, and the probability of a successful
exit increases by 5.43% where there are firm level educational connections. The increase is significant at the
5% level for an exit via IPO or sale and significant at the 1% level for the exit via IPO. This increase is
also economically meaningful given the IPO/Sale and IPO rate estimated at the mean level: 45% and 15%.
Although the coefficient of the existence of educational connections on the probability of a startup company
going through an M&A is positive, it is not statistically significant.
To distinguish the benefits of manager-manager educational connections of different degrees, we decom-
pose the indicator of educational ties according to degrees and perform the same OLS regression. The
analysis does not include educational ties such as those formed by JD, MD or PhD degree holders, as the
proportion of startup companies venture-backed by firms with these degree connections is less than 1%.
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Table 2.5: OLS of Exit Outcome on Syndicate Educational Connectedness
The table reports the results of OLS regression of exit outcomes on educational connections among VC managers from different VC
firms broken down by degrees. The coefficients are shown in the table and standard errors are heteroskedasticity robust and clustered
by industries. The coefficients of year dummies, school dummy variables and intercept are not shown in the table.
Variables I(IPO/Sale) I(IPO) I(SALE)
I_MgrConnBA 0.105516*** 0.075000*** 0.071369**
(0.03063) (0.02166) (0.03113)
I_MgrConnMA -0.090664** -0.033591 -0.051679
(0.04310) (0.02913) (0.04346)
I_MgrConnMBA 0.004519 0.016700 -0.000659
(0.02678) (0.01843) (0.02682)
Avg. Asset Under Mngmt. 7.6E-6* 5.5E-6** 4.7E-6
(4.26E-6) (2.4E-6) (3.8E-6)
Avg. Total $ Invested 1.6E-5*** 7.8E-6*** 1.1E-5***
(3.6E-6) (2.1E-6) (3.5E-6)
Avg. % IPO or Merger 0.004452 0.006434** 0.000919
(0.00493) (0.00313) (0.00470)
Avg. State HHI -0.031503 -0.044553** -0.036289
(0.02919) (0.01934) (0.02868)
Avg. Industry HHI 0.074585** 0.108123*** 0.032334
(0.03627) (0.02567) (0.03577)
California Inc 0.058578*** 0.021410*** 0.053430***
(0.012580) (0.00703) (0.01257)
Value-Weighted B/M -1.8E-6*** 4.0E-7** -2.2E-6***
(3.6E-7) (1.9E-7) (3.5E-7)
ln($ Inflows to VC Industry) -0.033279 -0.008665 -0.039488
(0.03508) (0.01279) (0.03456)
Observations 7,603 7,603 7,603
Cluster Industry Industry Industry
Rsquare 6.25% 13.01% 3.73%
Heteroskendasticity robust standard errors, clustered by industry, in parentheses
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1
I(StartupSuccess)jt = β0 + β1IMgrBA_Conn + β2IMgrMBA_Conn + β3IMgrMA_Conn + β4Avg_Experiecne{Firm}
+ β5Avg_Size{Firm} + β6Avg_IPO%{Firm} + β7IndicatorCalifornia
+ β8HHI{industry} + β9HHI{state} + β10DealF low{j′s industry} + β11Opport
The OLS regression results are reported in Table 2.5. It appears that the effect of educational connections
on exit outcome is contributed more by managerial bachelor’s degree rather than MBA or master’s degree.
All else being equal, the probability of a startup company going through an IPO/SALE increases by 10.55%,
an IPO increases by 7.50% and a Sale increases by 7.13% as a factor of bachelor’s-level educational ties as
compared to those for the first-round investments with no bachelor’s level connections. The increase in the
probability of an IPO/SALE and IPO exit are both significant at 1% and the increased likelihood of sale is
significant at the 5% level. All these increases resulting from bachelor’s level educational connections among
VC firms are economically meaningful compared to the estimated mean chance of a successful exit.
We repeat the OLS regressions as above with school fixed effects in Table 2.6, with school dummy variables
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taking on a value of 1 when there are educational ties from that particular institution, and 0 otherwise. Table
2.5 echoes results controlling school fixed effects. The likelihood of a startup company’s success is positively
associated with firm size and experience. Confirming previous findings in the present study and in the
work of Gompers et al., 2008, VC firms seem to respond to attractive investment opportunities signaled
by public market multiples i.e. industry level B/M ratio, though the coefficients of VC fund inflows are
not statistically significant. The positive association between educational connections and the successful
exit of startup companies seems to stem from the educational ties resulting from bachelor’s degrees. The
existence of bachelor’s degree connections increase the probability of an exit via IPO/Sale or IPO by 10.41%
and 11.71%, while these connections are not positively associated with the likelihood of an exit via sale with
statistical significance. Regression results suggest that educational ties derived from prestigious institutions
do not increase the likelihood of a successful exit for startup companies.
This dissertation incorporates propensity scores to reduce the bias caused by nonrandom treatment
assignment. A smooth coefficient model is more flexible since it can deal with multivariate or ordinal
treatment values as compared to propensity score matching method. Thus, we use a smooth coefficient
model to estimate the causal effects of educational ties as the number of educational connections are ordinal,
and we also attempt to estimate the educational ties associated with different degrees. As a robustness test,
I compare the results of two methods that apply propensity scores: propensity score matching and smooth
coefficient models. Table 2.7 documents the estimated average treatment effects of educational connections
based on three distinct degrees: bachelor’s, MBA and master’s, controlling for firm characteristics, investment
styles, company location, public market information, and both year and school fixed effects. The variables
of interest are indicators of bachelor’s, MBA and master’s level connections, respectively. We first produce
propensity scores generated for each of three indicators. Column 4, 5, and 6 of Table 2.7 show the estimated
average treatment effects using kernel propensity score matching in Stata. The limitation of such propensity
score matching is that we can only apply propensity score matching for one treatment at one time. The
estimated average treatment effects of educational ties based on bachelor’s degrees are much smaller using
propensity score matching compared to results in OLS models. Having bachelor’s level degree connections
increase the probability of an IPO/SALE and an IPO by 4.24% and 4.05% at the 10% level of significance
according to the propensity score matching model. However, bachelor’s degree level connections are not
positively associated with the chance of entering an M&A. Table 2.7, column 9, 10 and 11 show that the
estimated causal effects of bachelor’s level connections are also statistically positive according to the smooth
coefficient model. Bachelor’s degree connections increase the probability of an IPO/SALE and an IPO by
4.61% and 3.94% at the 5% level of significance according to the smooth coefficient model. In the smooth
87
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coefficient model, we allow the coefficients of bachelor’s level, MBA and master’s level connections to vary
smoothly with their corresponding propensity score respectively. Note that both the estimated treatment
effects of bachelor’s level connections are substantially smaller than those in the OLS models. We do not
find that educational connections among managers formed during master’s and MBA programs improve
the probability of a successful exit for startup companies using either the propensity score matching or
the smooth coefficient model. The complete smooth coefficient model regression results are documented in
Table 2.8. As we find above, it is more likely for a startup company to achieve a successful exit if they
are venture backed by larger and more experienced VC firms. Being in California also increases the chance
of an IPO or Sale. The coefficients of VC fund inflows are all statistically negative and those of industry
level B/M ratios are also negative except for the IPO outcome, which suggests that VC firms respond
to public market information rationally, confirming previous literature. Moreover, there is no empirical
evidence supporting the hypothesis that educational connections developed in more prestigious improve the
entrepreneurial company’s exit outcome.
The ultimate goal of the present study is to disentangle the benefits of knowledge and skills derived
from schooling and those derived from connections that professionals develop at educational institutions.
To distinguish educational ties from knowledge and skills, we include two sets of variables: the number
of managers with certain degrees and the number of educational connections based on those degrees. We
performed the analysis as follows.
I(StartupSuccess)jt = β0 + β1N{Bachelor} + β2N{Master} + β3N{PhD} + β4N{MBA} + β5N{JD} + β6N{MD}
+ β7N{Bachelor_Conn} + β8N{Master_Conn} + β10N{MBA_Conn} + β11IndicatorCalifornia
+ β12Avg_Experiecne+ β13Avg_FirmsSize+ β14Avg_IPO%
+ β15HHI{industry} + β16HHI{state} + β17DealF low{j′s industry} + β18Opport
The results of the OLS model are reported in Table 2.9 with the number of managers with certain degrees
and the educational connections associated with different degrees, both scaled and unscaled. According to
the OLS model, the probability of a successful exit is positively associated with the number of bachelor’s
level educational ties with and without the number educational ties being scaled. Educational connections
based on MBA degree do not improve exit outcome with or without the number of educational ties being
scaled.
The number of managers with a particular degree typically increases if there are more managers work-
ing on a deal. However, the OLS model produces different results for number of educational connections
associated with a master’s degree, with and without the independent variable being scaled. Moreover, it is
more likely for a company to exit via an IPO/SALE or SALE when there are more managers with bachelor’s
degrees in the unscaled mode while managers with bachelor’s degrees decreases the probability of an exit via
90
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IPO in the unscaled mode. Since over 90% of managers reportedly hold a bachelor’s degree in the current
sample, the number of bachelor’s degrees is highly correlated with firm size and experience. Thus, we scaled
the number of managers with certain degrees by the total number of managers. On the other hand, the
number of educational connections among managers is not only related to firm size, but also to number of VC
partners and number of managers in each firm. For purposes of interpretation, we do not scale the number
of educational connections. Propensity score functions and smooth coefficient models also help mitigate the
correlation between the educational connections and firm size.
We use smooth coefficient models to estimate the returns on education contributed by knowledge and
by educational connections, respectively. The smooth coefficient model allows coefficient and intercept to
vary with propensity function and it also supports multi-variate or ordinal treatments. Following Imai and
Van Dyk (2004), we fit the model with R package mgcv developed by Simon Wood, using Gaussian family
and identity links to model the conditional distribution of outcome. We produce propensity scores for the
number of managers with each degree and number of educational connections associated with each degree; we
allow intercept and coefficient to vary smoothly with corresponding propensity score. In order to understand
how the prestige of educational institutions impacts the success of a portfolio company, we also include school
dummy variables and educational connection dummy variables. Educational connection dummy variables
take on a value of 1 if a startup company is venture-backed by VC firms sharing educational connections
from a particular school and 0 otherwise.
Table 2.10 documents the smooth coefficient model results with school dummy variables and educational
connection dummy variables. According to the smooth coefficient model, a one standard deviation increase in
the B/M ratio decreases the probability of an exit via IPO/Sale, IPO and by Sale by 4.99%, 1.36%, and 4.79%,
respectively; a one standard deviation increase in the inflow to VC fund (Opport) decreases the probability
of an exit via IPO/Sale, IPO and by Sale by 5.00%, 4.82% and 3.36%, respectively. These findings support
the previous literature, including Gompers and Lerner (2000); Gompers et al. (2008) and Hochberg et al.
(2007) demonstrating that when public market signals indicate less favorable investment opportunities, the
probability of a successful exit is driven down. However, being located in the state of California is associated
with a higher probability of an IPO/SALE, IPO and Sale. Startup companies backed by more experienced
and larger VC firms enjoy a better chance of a successful exit, which is consistent with previous findings in this
dissertation. Smooth coefficient results suggest that knowledge and skills associated with different degrees
do not seem to increase the probability of a startup company’s exit via IPO/SALE, IPO or Sal. All else
being equal, one more firm-level educational connection at the Bachelor’s level increases the probability of an
exit via IPO/SALE, IPO, Sale by 2.43%, 1.15% and 1.96%, respectively, compared to those evaluated at the
93
T
ab
le
2.
10
:
Sm
oo
th
C
oe
ffi
ci
en
t
M
od
el
of
E
xi
t
O
ut
co
m
e
on
E
du
ca
ti
on
al
C
on
ne
ct
ed
ne
ss
w
it
h
P
ro
pe
ns
it
y
Fu
nc
ti
on
an
d
Sc
ho
ol
F
ix
ed
E
ffe
ct
s
T
he
ta
bl
e
re
po
rt
s
th
e
re
su
lt
s
of
ga
us
si
an
re
gr
es
si
on
m
od
el
of
ex
it
ou
tc
om
es
on
ed
uc
at
io
na
l
co
nn
ec
ti
on
s
am
on
g
V
C
m
an
ag
er
s
fr
om
di
ffe
re
nt
V
C
fir
m
s
br
ok
en
do
w
n
by
de
gr
ee
s
an
d
sc
ho
ol
ra
nk
in
gs
us
in
g
sm
oo
th
co
effi
ci
en
t
m
od
el
.
T
he
co
effi
ci
en
ts
ar
e
sh
ow
n
in
th
e
ta
bl
e
an
d
St
an
da
rd
er
ro
rs
ar
e
in
pa
re
nt
he
se
s.
T
he
nu
m
be
r
of
V
C
m
an
ag
er
s
ho
ld
in
g
ce
rt
ai
n
de
gr
ee
is
sc
al
ed
by
th
e
nu
m
be
r
m
an
ag
er
s
in
to
ta
l.
T
he
co
effi
ci
en
ts
of
ye
ar
du
m
m
ie
s,
sc
ho
ol
du
m
m
y
va
ri
ab
le
s
an
d
in
te
rc
ep
t
ar
e
no
t
sh
ow
n.
V
ar
ia
bl
es
I(
IP
O
/S
al
e)
I(
IP
O
)
I(
Sa
le
)
(1
)
(2
)
(1
)
(2
)
(1
)
(2
)
(1
)
(2
)
ln
(1
+
N
um
_
B
ac
he
lo
r_
S)
ha
rv
ar
d
un
iv
er
si
ty
0.
06
93
-0
.0
33
9
-0
.0
19
3
3.
5E
-3
0.
13
56
-0
.0
43
4
(m
gr
co
nn
by
sc
ho
ol
)
(0
.0
46
6)
(0
.0
46
1)
(0
.0
30
8)
(0
.0
10
2)
(0
.0
94
5)
(0
.0
43
5)
ln
(1
+
N
um
_
M
as
te
r_
S)
st
an
fo
rd
un
iv
er
si
ty
0.
02
67
-0
.0
53
9
2.
8E
-3
-7
.2
E
-3
0.
44
07
9.
7E
-3
(m
gr
co
nn
by
sc
ho
ol
)
(0
.0
88
2)
(0
.0
51
1)
(0
.0
17
8)
(0
.0
11
2)
(0
.2
89
4)
(0
.0
47
3)
ln
(1
+
N
um
_
M
B
A
_
S)
un
iv
er
si
ty
of
pe
nn
sy
lv
an
ia
0.
02
71
-0
.0
24
4
-1
.2
E
-3
6.
7E
-3
-0
.0
65
2
-0
.0
55
8
(m
gr
co
nn
by
sc
ho
ol
)
(0
.1
60
3)
(0
.0
51
5)
(0
.0
96
1)
(9
.8
E
-3
)
(0
.1
24
3)
(0
.0
47
2)
ln
(1
+
N
um
_
D
oc
to
ra
te
_
S)
da
rt
m
ou
th
co
lle
ge
-0
.1
18
7
-2
.5
E
-5
0.
02
07
-7
.3
E
-3
-0
.0
63
5
-0
.0
55
2
(m
gr
co
nn
by
sc
ho
ol
)
(0
.4
13
1)
(0
.0
83
5)
(0
.0
21
0)
(0
.0
12
0)
(0
.2
66
2)
(0
.0
75
4)
ln
(1
+
N
um
_
JD
_
S)
m
as
sa
ch
us
et
ts
in
st
it
ut
e
of
te
ch
no
lo
gy
-0
.0
38
3
0.
09
63
0.
09
49
2.
3E
-5
-0
.1
26
0
0.
06
16
(m
gr
co
nn
by
sc
ho
ol
)
(0
.3
98
5)
(0
.0
75
4)
(0
.2
21
2)
(0
.0
11
9)
(0
.3
25
3)
(0
.0
69
2)
ln
(1
+
N
um
_
M
D
_
S)
ya
le
un
iv
er
si
ty
-0
.0
57
7
-0
.1
70
6
0.
06
61
0.
03
04
**
-0
.0
29
6
0.
01
34
(m
gr
co
nn
by
sc
ho
ol
)
(0
.0
87
6)
(0
.1
42
3)
(0
.0
56
7)
(0
.0
13
2)
(0
.0
81
2)
(0
.1
28
2)
ln
(1
+
C
on
n_
B
ac
he
lo
r_
N
)
pr
in
ce
to
n
un
iv
er
si
ty
0.
05
07
**
-0
.0
88
5
0.
02
39
*
6.
3E
-3
0.
04
10
**
-0
.0
34
0
(m
gr
co
nn
by
sc
ho
ol
)
(0
.0
22
7)
(0
.0
93
9)
(0
.0
13
8)
(0
.0
12
1)
(0
.0
20
5)
(0
.0
82
3)
ln
(1
+
C
on
n_
M
as
te
r_
N
)
un
iv
er
si
ty
of
ca
lif
or
ni
a
be
rk
el
ey
-0
.0
25
0
-0
.0
29
2
-0
.0
32
3
-0
.0
26
0*
*
-0
.0
35
1
-0
.0
20
6
(m
gr
co
nn
by
sc
ho
ol
)
(0
.0
41
3)
(0
.0
75
8)
(0
.0
31
3)
(0
.0
12
1)
(0
.0
36
3)
(0
.0
69
4)
ln
(1
+
C
on
n_
M
B
A
_
N
)
co
lu
m
bi
a
un
iv
er
si
ty
-8
.1
E
-3
0.
09
47
9.
9E
-3
-3
.1
E
-3
-5
.1
E
-3
5.
5E
-3
(m
gr
co
nn
by
sc
ho
ol
)
(0
.0
17
9)
(0
.0
99
5)
(0
.0
11
3)
(0
.0
12
5)
(0
.0
16
5)
(0
.0
89
9)
St
an
da
rd
er
ro
rs
ar
e
in
pa
re
nt
he
se
s
**
*p
<
0.
01
,
**
p<
0.
05
,
*p
<
0.
1
94
T
ab
le
2.
10
:
Sm
oo
th
C
oe
ffi
ci
en
t
M
od
el
of
E
xi
t
O
ut
co
m
e
on
E
du
ca
ti
on
al
C
on
ne
ct
ed
ne
ss
w
it
h
P
ro
pe
ns
it
y
Fu
nc
ti
on
an
d
Sc
ho
ol
F
ix
ed
E
ffe
ct
s
(c
on
ti
nu
ed
)
T
he
ta
bl
e
re
po
rt
s
th
e
re
su
lt
s
of
ga
us
si
an
re
gr
es
si
on
m
od
el
of
ex
it
ou
tc
om
es
on
ed
uc
at
io
na
l
co
nn
ec
ti
on
s
am
on
g
V
C
m
an
ag
er
s
fr
om
di
ffe
re
nt
V
C
fir
m
s
br
ok
en
do
w
n
by
de
gr
ee
s
an
d
sc
ho
ol
ra
nk
in
gs
us
in
g
sm
oo
th
co
effi
ci
en
t
m
od
el
.
T
he
co
effi
ci
en
ts
ar
e
sh
ow
n
in
th
e
ta
bl
e
an
d
St
an
da
rd
er
ro
rs
ar
e
in
pa
re
nt
he
se
s.
T
he
nu
m
be
r
of
V
C
m
an
ag
er
s
ho
ld
in
g
ce
rt
ai
n
de
gr
ee
is
sc
al
ed
by
th
e
nu
m
be
r
m
an
ag
er
s
in
to
ta
l.
T
he
co
effi
ci
en
ts
of
ye
ar
du
m
m
ie
s,
sc
ho
ol
du
m
m
y
va
ri
ab
le
s
an
d
in
te
rc
ep
t
ar
e
no
t
sh
ow
n.
V
ar
ia
bl
es
I(
IP
O
/S
al
e)
I(
IP
O
)
I(
Sa
le
)
(1
)
(2
)
(1
)
(2
)
(1
)
(2
)
(1
)
(2
)
A
vg
.
A
ss
et
U
nd
er
M
ng
m
t.
ha
rv
ar
d
un
iv
er
si
ty
2.
1E
-5
**
*
0.
04
29
**
*
1.
9E
-5
**
*
0.
01
33
1.
9E
-5
**
*
0.
03
55
**
*
(s
ch
oo
l
fix
ed
eff
ec
t)
(5
.8
E
-6
)
(0
.0
16
0)
(3
.5
E
-6
)
(0
.0
30
3)
(5
.2
E
-6
)
(0
.0
14
6)
A
vg
.
T
ot
al
$
In
ve
st
ed
st
an
fo
rd
un
iv
er
si
ty
3.
1E
-5
**
*
-3
.1
E
-3
1.
8E
-5
**
*
-0
.0
77
2*
*
1.
7E
-5
**
5.
0E
-3
(s
ch
oo
l
fix
ed
eff
ec
t)
(9
.7
E
-6
)
(0
.0
17
7)
(5
.4
E
-6
)
(0
.0
32
8)
(7
.9
E
-6
)
(0
.0
16
1)
A
vg
.
%
IP
O
or
M
er
ge
r
un
iv
er
si
ty
of
pe
nn
sy
lv
an
ia
9.
8E
-3
4.
2E
-3
9.
2E
-3
*
-0
.0
15
6
3.
8E
-3
3.
1E
-3
(s
ch
oo
l
fix
ed
eff
ec
t)
(7
.9
E
-3
)
(0
.0
15
6)
(5
.1
E
-3
)
(0
.0
32
9)
(7
.3
E
-3
)
(0
.0
14
2)
A
vg
.
St
at
e
H
H
I
da
rt
m
ou
th
co
lle
ge
0.
35
51
**
*
-0
.0
27
1
0.
21
96
**
*
-0
.0
26
7
0.
32
65
**
*
-7
.1
E
-3
(s
ch
oo
l
fix
ed
eff
ec
t)
(0
.0
50
3)
(0
.0
20
0)
(0
.0
32
7)
(0
.0
52
2)
(0
.0
50
9)
(0
.0
17
2)
A
vg
.
In
du
st
ry
H
H
I
m
as
sa
ch
us
et
ts
in
st
it
ut
e
of
te
ch
no
lo
gy
0.
26
80
**
*
1.
5E
-3
0.
28
32
**
*
0.
02
35
0.
20
10
**
*
-1
.6
E
-3
(s
ch
oo
l
fix
ed
eff
ec
t)
(0
.0
67
5)
(0
.0
19
3)
(0
.0
40
7)
(0
.0
48
1)
(0
.0
59
9)
(0
.0
17
2)
C
al
i_
IN
C
ya
le
un
iv
er
si
ty
0.
05
15
**
*
0.
08
09
**
*
0.
02
49
**
*
0.
04
20
0.
04
61
**
*
0.
04
39
**
(s
ch
oo
l
fix
ed
eff
ec
t)
(0
.0
13
7)
(0
.0
21
3)
(9
.2
E
-3
)
(0
.0
88
8)
(0
.0
13
2)
(0
.0
19
0)
V
al
ue
-W
ei
gh
te
d
B
/M
pr
in
ce
to
n
un
iv
er
si
ty
-3
.3
E
-6
**
*
0.
01
63
-8
.9
E
-7
**
-0
.1
20
4*
*
-3
.1
E
-6
**
*
0.
03
32
*
(s
ch
oo
l
fix
ed
eff
ec
t)
(6
.1
E
-7
)
(0
.0
20
2)
(3
.8
E
-7
)
(0
.0
56
7)
(5
.5
E
-7
)
(0
.0
17
6)
ln
($
In
flo
w
s
to
V
C
In
du
st
ry
)
un
iv
er
si
ty
of
ca
lif
or
ni
a
be
rk
el
ey
-0
.0
39
6*
**
0.
02
19
-0
.0
38
2*
**
-0
.0
20
1
-0
.0
26
7*
**
-2
.5
E
-3
(s
ch
oo
l
fix
ed
eff
ec
t)
(6
.6
E
-3
)
(0
.0
20
9)
(4
.3
E
-3
)
(0
.0
48
2)
(6
.3
E
-3
)
(0
.0
17
4)
N
of
ob
se
rv
at
io
ns
co
lu
m
bi
a
un
iv
er
si
ty
7,
60
3
-0
.0
19
6
7,
60
3
0.
07
12
7,
60
3
-0
.0
38
0*
*
R
sq
ua
re
(s
ch
oo
l
fix
ed
eff
ec
t)
8.
10
%
(0
.0
21
4)
14
.3
%
(0
.0
62
9)
5.
56
%
(0
.0
18
1)
St
an
da
rd
er
ro
rs
ar
e
in
pa
re
nt
he
se
s
**
*p
<
0.
01
,
**
p<
0.
05
,
*p
<
0.
1
95
mean level of educational connections. The effects on IPO/SALE and SALE are significant at the 5% level
while the effect on IPO is significant at the 10% level. The estimated benefits of bachelor’s level connections
are economically meaningful relative to both the effects of public market information on the probability of a
successful exit and the mean probability of a successful exit. However, firm level connections associated with
MBA and master’s degrees are not positively associated with the success of a startup company. Furthermore,
according to column 4, 6 and 8, educational connections developed in prestigious universities do not improve
the likelihood of a startup company going public or going through a M&A, with the exception of Yale
University when we measure company success as going public. Having managers who attended Harvard
University increases the probability of an IPO/SALE by 4.29% and a Sale by 3.55%. Employing managers
who graduated from Yale University also improves the probability of an IPO/SALE by 8.09% and that of
a Sale by 4.39%. However, there is no premium associated with other top ranked universities. Evidence
suggests that the financial returns on education in the VC industry are comprised substantially of the benefits
of educational connections formed at the bachelor’s level rather than the knowledge or skills obtained with
advanced degrees. There is no empirical evidence supporting the notion that educational connections built
and developed by pursuing an MBA improve the startup company’s performance. Attending Harvard and
Yale University, by contrast, does in fact increase VC manager earnings and is positively associated with
the likelihood of and IPO/SALE or Sale. However, attending other prestigious educational institutions does
not guarantee higher earnings.
2.4.2 The Value of Educational Networks for VC Managers and Start-up
Founders
The value of managerial networks consists not only of the benefits of firm-level educational networks,
but also of the benefits of educational connections between VC managers and startup company board mem-
bers. Bengtsson and Hsu (2010) argue that the match between entrepreneurs and VC managers is more
likely if both parties attended top-ranked universities, as trust lowers transaction cost when entrepreneurs
and VC managers search for partnerships. Shared educational backgrounds also improve coordination and
monitoring between managers of VC firms and start-up founders while VC managers nurture and co-manage
the entrepreneurial company (Hegde and Tumlinson, 2013). On the other hand, manager networks with
founders may foster nepotism, and thus compromise the economic benefits of educational ties. To estimate
the benefits of VC manager educational networks, this dissertation takes account in evaluating the educa-
tional ties between VC managers and start-up founders and quantitatively compares these with firm level
educational ties among VC managers.
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We first analyze how the presence of educational connections between VC managers and start-up company
founders affect manager earnings, where we add indicators of interest that take on a value of 1 if there is at
least one pair of VC mangers and entrepreneurs receiving the same degree from the same university, and 0
otherwise. We fit the following regression with a smooth coefficient model and the estimated coefficients are
reported in Table 2.11.
I(StartupSuccess)jt = β0 + β1IMgrBA_Conn + β2IMgrMBA_Conn + β3IMgrMA_Conn + β4IMgrBoardBA_Conn
+ β5IMgrBoardMBA_Conn + β6IMgrBoardMA_Conn + β7Avg_Experiecne{Firm}+
+ β8Avg_Size{Firm} + β9Avg_IPO%{Firm} + β10IndicatorCalifornia
+ β11HHI{industry} + β12HHI{state} + β13DealFlow{j′s industry} + β14Opport
Taking into account the educational ties between VC managers and entrepreneurs, we still find that
bachelor’s level connections among VC managers improve the probability of a successful exit as reflected by
IPO/Sale and IPO. The probability of an IPO/Sale and an IPO increases by 4.68% and 3.30%, respectively,
with VC manager bachelor’s level connections as compared to alliances lacking connections from the bache-
lor’s degree. There is no evidence supporting the notion that educational connections from more advanced
degrees among VC managers improves manager’s earnings by increasing the probability of a successful exit
by a startup company. Presence of educational ties from the MBA level between managers and founders
increase the probability of an IPO/SALE, IPO and Sale by 4.27%, 2.75%, and 3.75%, respectively, with in-
creases statistically significant at the 10% level, while educational connections from bachelor’s and master’s
degrees do not seem to increase VC manager earnings. Educational ties developed based on top ranking
universities are not particularly valuable contributors to manager earnings.
The number of educational connections are incorporated in the analysis to quantify and compare manager-
manager and manager-founder educational ties. A smooth coefficient model is used to fit the following
model. It contains the number of managers with different degrees and the number of manager-manager and
manager-founder educational connections with different degrees to vary smoothly with their corresponding
propensity score. The sample is again restricted to the startup company’s first round investments. Table
2.12 documents the estimated causal effects of educational ties in the following analysis.
I(StartupSuccess)jt = β0 + β1N{BA} + β2N{MA} + β3N{PhD} + β4N{MBA} + β5N{JD} + β6N{MD}
+ β7N{MrgBA_Conn} + β8N{MgrMA_Conn} + β10N{MgrMBA_Conn} + β11N{MrgBoardBA_Conn}
+ β12N{MgrBoardMA_Conn} + β13N{MgrBoardMBA_Conn} + β14Avg_Experiecne + β15Avg_FirmsSize
+ β16Avg_IPO% + β17HHI{industry} + β18HHI{state} + β19DealFlow{j′s industry} + β20Opport
After controlling for firm characteristics, company location and public market signals, we find that
bachelor’s level educational connections are one primary contributor to VC manager earnings. All else
being equal, sharing one more firm-level educational tie increases the probability of an IPO/SALE by 2.14%
and that of an IPO by 1.04%, relative to the probability calculated from the mean number of firm-level
educational ties. Educational ties resulting from the MBA between VC managers and entreperneurs also
seem to increase VC manager earnings, since sharing one additional educational tie from an MBA program
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increases the probability of Sale by 2.86% at the 1% level of significance. Compared to the effects of
public market information and the mean successful exit ratio, these increases are economically meaningful.
However, there is no evidence that the knowledge and skills learned when professionals were pursuing their
bachelor,’s master’s, MBA, JD, MD and PhD improve manager earnings in the VC industry. According
to Table 2.12 where the anaylsis controls for the educational networks between VC managers and start-up
founders, attending Harvard University does reward professionals in the industry, in that the probability
of a successful exit via an IPO/SALE and via Sale increases by 3.67% and 3.09%, respectively, if there
is at least one VC manager holding a degree from Harvard University. However, there is no such school
effect for Yale University when we add educational networks between VC managers and entrepreneurs in the
smooth coefficient model. There is no evidence suggesting other top ranking schools grant VC managers such
premiums in the industry. Moreover, educational ties developed at more prestigious educational institutions
do not increase VC manger’s future earnings in the industry according to the smooth coefficient model.
2.4.3 The Benefit of Firm Level Educational Networks Among VC Managers
Through Personal Contacts
Educational networks among VC managers increase their earnings by facilitating information diffusion
and lowering the costs of coordination and communication in a syndicate. Similarity in educational back-
ground serves as a trust mechanism and potentially lowers transaction costs when VC firms search for
syndicate partners. The information could flow through “friends of friends” or more personal connections, as
well as allow for better understanding among managers from different VC firms. The ideal way to estimate
the benefits of personal connections nurtured and developed through education is to identify those profes-
sionals who pursued the same degree at the same institutions during the same period. Since information on
those time periods is not available from Capital IQ, similar age is used as a proxy for temporal overlap at a
university while pursuing the same degree, after Bhagwat (2011). Two VC managers are defined as having a
“personal connection” if they receive the same degree from the same educational institution at a similar age4.
Note that the educational connections defined in this way are coarser for the graduate level educational ties
than the bachelor’s level educational ties since graduate education is more likely to be pursued at different
ages compared to college education.
According to the analysis using a smooth coefficient model (Table 2.13), the presence of personal con-
nections developed at the bachelor’s degree level increase the probability of an IPO by 4.8% relative to the
probability without personal connections from the bachelor’s degree. This increase (4.80%) is slightly greater
4Two professionals are of similar age if their years of birth are within 5 years of each other
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than the impact of educational connections defined as holding bachelor’s degree from the same university
during any given time period, which led to an increase of 3.94 %. However, the presence of such personal
connections (i.e., bachelor’s degree from the same institution at similar age) does not improve the startup
company’s probability of succeeding via an IPO/SALE or Sale. In addition, consistent with previous find-
ings, the coefficients on B/M ratios and VC fund inflows are all negative and significant, suggesting that VC
firms rationally respond to public market signals. More experienced VC firms are also associated with higher
probability of success for the investments they support. We incorporate propensity scores in the smooth
coefficient model to estimate the benefit of personal connections developed through schooling. Regression
coefficients are documented in Table 2.14. Confirming the previous findings in this dissertation, skills and
knowledge obtained by pursing different degrees are not particularly rewarded in the VC industry and more
advanced degrees are not associated with increases in manger compensation. All else being equal, sharing
one additional personal connection formed at the bachelor’s degree level increases the probability of an IPO
by 7.02%, which is substantially greater than the impact of educational connections defined as receiving
a bachelor’s degree from the same university (1.15%). Moreover, personal connections developed at the
bachelor’s level only increase manager earnings by improving the probability of exit via IPO for a portfolio
company. According to Table 2.14, a degree from Harvard University and Yale University increases VC
manager earnings by improving the odds of a successful exit for their portfolio companies, while education
from other high ranking universities are not positively associated with the probability of successful exit for
startup companies. Thus, there is no evidence supporting the notion that personal connections formed at
top ranked institutions improves manager’s future earnings in the VC industry.
2.5 Conclusion
The second study of this dissertation, Chapter 2, quantitatively characterizes the educational connections
associated with different degrees in the VC industry and how educational networks affect manager earnings.
Empirical results suggest that only firm-level educational connections among managers resulting from the
bachelor’s degree increase manager earnings by improving the startup company’s probability of success.
Additionally, the presence of educational ties between VC managers and startup company founders formed
in MBA programs increases manager earnings by improving the probability of successful exits for portfolio
companies, although firm-level educational connections among VC managers formed during MBA programs
do not improve startup company performance. Evidence also suggests that educational networks developed
from attending highly ranked educational institutions do not increase earnings, and, furthermore, knowledge
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accumulated from pursuing more advanced degrees is not particularly rewarded in VC literature. The
finding that educational networks formed at prestigious educational institutions do not increase earnings is
consistent with the evidence suggested in (Cohen et al., 2008), in which they find that connection premium
is not driven by Ivy League schools in the mutual fund industry. We only find a premium for degrees from
Harvard University and Yale University, while attending other more prestigious universities is not associated
with higher earnings from the standpoint of successful exits of portfolio companies.
The evidence suggesting graduate connections among VC managers do not affect future success of syn-
dicate seem to contrast with the results in (Cohen et al., 2008). They show that a replicating portfolio of
educationally connected stocks outperforms that of non-connected stocks, where most mutual managers in
their sample hold an MBA and thus MBA level connections make up a substantial portion of the observations.
The conflicting results raise other interesting questions: Do graduate level connections among VC managers
affect the future success of syndicates through more personal contacts? Do graduate level connections among
VC managers facilitate career change or job search? This dissertation studies the contribution of educational
networks while evaluating the returns to schooling in the VC industry, taking the educational networks as a
given. However, educational networks play an important role as professionals search for positions in the VC
industry Karlan et al. (2009); Ioannides and Loury (2004); Bian (1997); Yanjie (1999); Granovetter (1974).
Educational networks also impact VC manager earnings by influencing the likelihood that they secure a
position in the industry, transfer to a different VC fund, or whether they can find a position in a more
experienced firm. Although this dissertation expands on the returns-to-education literature by exploring
how networks impact earnings in the VC industry, with more detailed information (i.e. graduation year,
career change), we might be better able to appreciate how social and educational connections contribute to
earnings as well as company growth and expansion in more dynamic ways in the future.
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